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This is the story of the continuing tribulations of that little clause
tucked at the end of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion which provides, in a rather straightforward manner, that "private
property" shall not be "taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." 1 Consistent construction of these few words holds extreme impor-
tance for both property owners and government regulators. But,
notwithstanding its seeming linguistic simplicity, the takings clause has
engendered Supreme Court precedent as convoluted as the plot of a
pulp novel. Over sixty-five years ago, Justice Holmes declared that the
clause requires compensation if the government encroaches "too far"
upon property rightg.2 Unfortunately, however, there has been little
agreement regarding when that point is reached.3 And, although the
Court recently emphasized the theoretical importance of the clause when
it concluded that all "takings" - even temporary ones - require com-
pensation,4 the most important element of the constitutional story line
remains obscure: the Court has candidly recognized its inability to de-
duce "objective rules" that will clearly indicate when government action
"becomes a taking." 5 As a result, hardly any one, whether property
owner or government regulator, can be certain that this tale will have a
happy ending.
6
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University School of Law. B.A. 1976;J.D. 1979,
Brigham Young University.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414-16 (1922) (land use regulations constitute
a taking if they go "too far;" the State of Pennsylvania had taken a mining company's property by
legislating that certain coal must be left in place to prevent surface subsidence).
3 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242-46 (1987) (Court
concludes that, on balance, a statute virtually identical to the one at issue in Pennsylvania Coal now
passes constitutional muster; Pennsylvania's requirement that certain coal be left in the ground to
prevent subsidence does not constitute a taking because the regulation does not make over-all oper-
ation of the coal mines unprofitable and the state has a substantial interest in preventing surface
damage).
4 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389
(1987).
5 Id. at 2399 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); An-
drus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
183-84 (1978)).
6 Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. at 2393-
400 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority should not have reached the issue whether a
"temporary taking" required compensation because, on the facts presented, it was a legal certainty
that the lower courts on remand would find that the regulatory action did not amount to a taking).
The dismal state of the takings clause has been frequently noted. Many distinguished writers
have commented on the Court's crazy-quilt takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., C. Harr, LAND USE PLAN-
NING (3d ed. 1977); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974);
Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The conundrum created by current takings clause jurisprudence can
be understood by considering the plight of two hypothetical landowners,
each owning property affected by government action. The first is a typi-
cal homeowner, who has been informed the city will condemn a portion
of her backyard vegetable garden to build a highway. The second is a
developer who, after publicizing her plans to build a twenty-five-story
office tower within the scope of long-standing zoning regulations, learns
that a group of nearby residents opposed to the development has per-
suaded the city commissioners to enact a "mountain view" ordinance.
The ordinance, enacted after the residents unsuccessfully attempted to
block the office tower by changing the applicable zoning regulations, di-
minishes the value of the second owner's property by at least sixty-five
percent because it prohibits any construction over forty feet in height in
order to protect the residents' view of distant mountains.
Both property owners have at least a rudimentary understanding
that, while the city may put their property to "public use," the city's abil-
ity to "take" the property hinges upon the payment of "just compensa-
tion." 7 The property owners, to be sure, may not frame the taking issue
in constitutional terms, but the basic operative provisions of the fifth
amendment's takings clause are understood: "If the city wants to benefit
my neighbors by putting my vegetable garden or my developable air
space to a public use, it must pay for that privilege."
But, despite the obvious common sense similarities between the
property owners' plights,8 under current Supreme Court precedent a dis-
parate outcome for each case is virtually guaranteed. The homeowner
will be awarded enough money to keep her in tomatoes for years. 9 The
other landowner - who by any realistic measure suffered a substantial
injury when she lost the right to build her office tower - will be dis-
missed without a dime. 10 Instead of cash, she will receive the admonition
that "[l]egislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly
burdens some more than others,""i perhaps bolstered with a back-
handed compliment for preserving a scenic view that will make a long-
lasting contribution to the public weal. 12
1962 S. Ct. Rev. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Clause is
Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). For an historical overview of the takings clause see
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.
J. 694 (1985).
7 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
8 In both cases, government has taken an easement to permit access - in the first case physical,
in the second case visual - across real property.
9 Cf Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-40 (1982) (statute
requiring landlord to permit physical installation of cable television wires on her apartment building
constitutes a taking requiring payment ofjust compensation).
10 Cf Landmark Land Co. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed sub
nom., Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987) (involving challenge to Denver
"mountain view" ordinance which placed 42-foot height limitation on property previously zoned for
the construction of high-rise office towers; the evidence showed that the property owner suffered a
65% diminution in the value of the commercially zoned property).
11 Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978).
12 Cf id. at 132 (turning aside a challenge to the New York landmark preservation law, at least in
part because the statue "preserve[s] structures of historic or aesthetic interest").
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The contrasting results of the two cases just examined, though
hardly satisfying, are virtually mandated by the Supreme Court's recent
attempts to delineate the functional boundaries of the takings clause.
The Court has identified pragmatic factors to govern the application of
the clause, including the nature or character of the government action
involved, the economic impact on the property owner, and the extent to
which the government action interferes with distinct investment-backed
expectations.' 3 But, like old dogs, these criteria have lain toothless by
the wayside, nary able to take a healthy nip at the heels of the govern-
ment regulators. Indeed, while repeatedly invoking its multiple-factor
test, the Court has found a taking only in cases involving either physical
dispossession' 4 or, less frequently, total destruction of some right closely
related to physical dominion over property.' 5 Such cases, however, "are
relatively rare." ' 6 Accordingly, the vast majority of governmental actions
adversely affecting the interests of property owners escape with little or
no constitutional scrutiny.
This Article suggests that the Court's lax construction of the takings
clause demands correction. To further that end, the Article critiques the
takings clause analysis presently used by the Court. That analysis has
generally proceeded on two levels, with the Court (1) inquiring whether
government regulation exceeds "police power" limitations, and then (2)
examining whether the regulation, even if a legitimate exercise of police
power, nevertheless constitutes a taking. Each level of the analysis, along
with suggestions for improvement, will be examined in turn.
The first section of the Article scrutinizes the "police power" test
applied to takings clause cases. Under the police power analysis, the
Court inquires whether government regulation bears a substantial rela-
tionship to a legitimate state interest. 17 Although this inquiry tradition-
ally has not operated as a significant limitation on the regulation of
property rights, 18 the Court has rather abruptly suggested that the analy-
sis has real bite.' 9 The wisdom of testing legislative or administrative
action against a rigorous "means/ends" standard, however, is questiona-
ble. Such an approach proved unmanageable and unwise in the heyday
of "substantive due process," and there is little reason to think the meth-
13 Id. at 124.
14 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Cf First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2393-400 (1987) (Stevens,J, dissenting) (the majority should not have
reached the taking issue because, on the facts presented, it was a legal certainty that the regulatory
action did not amount to a taking); Humbach, A Unifying Theory for theJust-Compensation Cases: Takings,
Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982).
15 Government regulation cannot destroy a "fundamental attribute of ownership." Agins v. City
ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980). For examples of such "attributes," see Hodel v. Irving, 107 S.
Ct. 2076, 2083 (1987) (right to "pass on property" to "one's heirs" or "to one's family"); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (right to exclude).
16 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. at 2393.
17 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 260-62; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. at 127.
18 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926).
19 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1987).
1989]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
odology will prove more workable - or justifiable - in the context of
the takings clause.
If the police power hurdle is cleared, government action must be
scrutinized to determine whether it constitutes a "taking." Beginning
with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,20 the Court recognized that govern-
ment regulation, even though it does not result in physical dispossession
of the property owner, can nevertheless constitute a taking if it goes "too
far." 21 The second section of this Article explores the current status of
this inquiry.
In the sixty-six years since the Pennsylvania Coal test was first an-
nounced, government regulation has become one of the nation's true
growth industries. The Court, accordingly, has attempted to isolate spe-
cific criteria to aid in delineating the "far" from the "near." These crite-
ria, however, have never been rigorously applied. As a consequence, and
despite the counter-intuitive nature of the results, vegetable garden own-
ers are given cold hard cash for lost zucchini while investors are given the
boot for millions of dollars in development rights that are lost when the
city condemns a scenic easement over their property.
22
This condition should not continue. 23 The third section of the Arti-
cle suggests a relatively modest solution: the Court should demonstrate
that its takings clause analysis is more than high-toned rhetoric. Fifth
amendment doctrine, I believe, does not need wholesale revamping - it
needs a vitamin pill. The Constitution provides just compensation for all
takings, even temporary ones.24 And, determining which governmental
actions constitute "takings" is not so difficult a task that the Court should
relegate the takings clause to the status of a constitutional myth. Indeed,
the Court has already identified factors that, if consistently and carefully
applied, furnish a workable contemporary plot for the clause. The
Court, however, simply has not demanded adherence to its own story
line. The time has come for the Court to brush off its traditional takings
analysis and demonstrate that it means what it says.
II. The Police Power Limit: Do the Means Relate To The Ends?
As Justice Brennan has recently noted, there can be little "dispute
that the police power of the States encompasses the authority to impose
conditions" on the ownership and use of property. 25 Whether such con-
ditions exceed the legitimate scope of the police power has been tested
20 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21 Id. at 415.
22 Landmark Land Co. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987).
23 See Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation On The Power Of Eminent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty
Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REV. 231, 264 (1984) (urging judges deciding takings cases to "be more
careful to protect the individual from excessive governmental schemes"); cf. Oakes, 'Property Rights"
In ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 625-26 (1981) (predicting a "new era" in the
judicial protection of property rights and noting that "the takings clause has suddenly come to the
fore") (footnote omitted).
24 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388
(1987).
25 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3151 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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under a familiar "means/ends" test: government regulation must "sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests." 26 The rigor with which this
analysis has been applied to various exertions of governmental authority
has waxed and waned throughout this century - mostly waning during
recent decades. Indeed, apart from legislation regulating certain funda-
mental rights, 2 7 the "means/ends" test has rarely been considered to be
a serious contemporary constitutional limitation. But, after nearly half a
century of deference, the Supreme Court has signalled a new willingness
to apply a "means/ends" test with real vigor to governmental actions
adversely affecting the use or ownership of property. 28 Whether this is a
wise - or workable - development, however, is debatable.
As any student of constitutional law knows, the requirement that leg-
islative means "reasonably" 29 further legitimate governmental ends was
applied with devastating effect to numerous legislative enactments dur-
ing the first three decades of this century. The approach, which came to
be known as "substantive due process,"30 was used to invalidate every-
thing from regulations limiting a baker's working hours31 to major por-
tions of Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal" legislation. 32 Because the
doctrine was used to disable major legislative and executive resolutions
of pressing social policy issues, substantive due process engendered sig-
nificant political opposition. Roosevelt threatened his famous "Court-
packing" plan in an attempt to obtain a majority ofJustices disinclined to
invoke the doctrine.3 3 But, of more immediate concern, the doctrine was
severely criticized as an undue judicial intrusion upon the operation of
the coordinate branches of government.
3 4
Ajudicial conclusion that a given governmental action did not "rea-
sonably" or "substantially" further "legitimate" ends was, at bottom, a
declaration that the Court disagreed with either the wisdom of the means
used to achieve the stated goal or the propriety of the goal itself. In its
26 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
27 E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (right of association); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (right of association); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925) (familial privacy; the "liberty of parents ... to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control").
28 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987).
29 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
30 A strict requirement that legislative means substantially further legitimate governmental ends
was based upon the Supreme Court's assumption that the due process clause gives substantive pro-
tection to various "liberty" interests explicitly mentioned in or implicitly derived from the express
provisions of the Constitution. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
31 See, e.g., id (striking down a state law limiting a baker's work day to 10 hours because the
legislature had "no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker"); Cf Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (striking down New York law forbidding employment of
women at an oppressive or unfair wage).
32 E.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). See also United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
33 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1949).
34 E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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most elementary form, therefore, substantive due process was used to
supplant and invalidate public policy decisions which proved unpopular
to a majority of the Supreme Court.35 The "narrow conception of ra-
tionality" which infused the doctrine was little more than "a judicial arro-
gation of legislative authority."
3 6
When it became evident that requiring "scientific precision" in the
fit between legislative means and ends was simply a method of enforcing
the Court's own views of sound public policy, the Justices abandoned a
strict "means/ends" analysis because the test constituted "an intolerable
supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government. ... "7 In
its place, the Court erected a highly deferential "means/ends" inquiry. A
legislative enactment "need not be in every respect logically consistent
with its aims to be constitutional;" rather "[i]t is enough that there is an
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particu-
lar legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."38
Interestingly enough, the substantive due process blunderbuss -
even during its prime - was rarely fired successfully at legislative
enactments restricting the ownership or use of property.3 9 For
example, in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,40 the Court upheld a city ordinance
that prohibited the manufacturing of bricks despite the manufacturer's
claim that the prohibition deprived him of the profitable use of
his backyard. The Court stated that the city had a legitimate public
purpose in preventing a nuisance (such as a brickyard) from operating
in residential areas, and held that the challenged ordinance was a
reasonable means to achieve that purpose.41 Similarly, in Welch v.
35 Cf Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("Our recent decisions
make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide
whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.... [S]tate legislatures have consti-
tutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the
public welfare").
36 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3153 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963) ("The doctrine that ... due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely... has long since been discarded. We have returned
to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies").
38 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only
against deprivation without due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social
and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a
valid state objective"). See also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
39 See generally Oakes, "Property Rights"in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 591-
94 (1981) (describing generally the protection accorded property rights by substantive due process).
40 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
41 Id. at 410-12. Cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (upholding licensing restriction
forbidding the operation of a brewery because "all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community"); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (upholding state law requiring the destruction of trees which carry
cedar rust in order to protect producing apple orchards from infection; "where the public interest is
involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of
its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which
affects property"); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
385, 418-24 (1977) (suggesting that the rigor of the takings analysis depends upon whether or not
challenged government action abated a nuisance).
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Swasey42 and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,43 the Court sustained
zoning ordinances that adversely affected the complainants' property val-
ues because the ordinances were rationally related to the health and
safety of the community. 44 In fact, a "means/ends" attack upon land use
regulations succeeded only once during the reign of substantive due pro-
cess. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge,45 the Court invalidated a zoning ordi-
nance which permitted only residential use of property located in a
heavily industrialized area. Noting that land use regulations must bear a
"substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare," the Court found that the ordinance in question failed the
"means/ends" test because it had "no foundation in reason" and was "a
mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power."
'46
Following Nectow, and consistent with the general decline in thejudi-
ciary's enthusiasm for a strict "means/ends" analysis, the police power
limitation on government actions affecting the use or ownership of prop-
erty came to have little practical significance. Indeed, in rejecting a po-
lice power challenge to a land use regulation in the first such case to
come before it since Nectow, the Supreme Court wrote that "[t]he con-
cept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive" and the role of the
judiciary in restricting the exercise of the police power "is an extremely
narrow one." 47 The "legislature," the Court wrote, "not the judiciary, is
the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation
.... ,"48 Eight years later, in rejecting the claim that a municipal ordi-
nance which prohibited the excavation of gravel below the water table
constituted a taking, the Court reiterated that " 'debatable questions' "
regarding the" 'interests of the public' "and the" 'means ... reasonably
necessary' " to accomplish public purposes " 'are not for the courts but
for the legislatures.' -49 Thus, although regulations affecting the use or
ownership of property were required to have a reasonable relationship to
legitimate objectives, the test "result[ed] in a rubber stamp of approval
in fact if not in theory."50 But, as if to prove that aged doctrines never
die (nor, like old soldiers, even fade away), the Supreme Court has re-
recruited a strict "means/ends" test and placed it at the forefront of the
takings clause analysis.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission51 the Court invalidated the
California Coastal Commission's requirement that the Nollans grant the
42 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
43 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. at 105-06; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 387-
89. In Welch, the Court recited that a statute "passed under the exercise of so-called police power"
passes constitutional scrutiny if it merely has "some fair tendency to accomplish, or aid in the accom-
plishment of some purpose, for which the legislature may use the power." 214 U.S. at 105.
45 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
46 Id. at 187-88 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 395).
47 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
48 Id. at 32.
49 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)).
50 Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 1011, 1020 (1983)
(citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-3 (1978)).
51 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143, 3148-50 (1987).
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public an easement to pass along the seawall located on their shorefront
property as a condition of obtaining a permit to build a new home on
their lot. The Commission had exacted the easement based on its find-
ing that the proposed home would contribute to a " 'wall' of residential
structures" that would cumulatively "burden the public's ability to trav-
erse to and along the shorefront. ' ' 52 The Commission, therefore, had
concluded that the required "access condition.., was sufficiently related
to burdens created by the project to be constitutional. ' 53 The Court, by
contrast, found that the Nollans' proposed home did not burden the
public's ability to pass along the shoreline but blocked, at most, "visual
access" to the beach. The Court accordingly held that the contested
easement was insufficiently related to the amelioration of that burden:
"It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people al-
ready on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property
reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house."
54
The decision in Nollan marks the return - with a vengeance - of a
strict "means/ends" analysis. Relying upon language from earlier cases
that rather perfunctorily recited the traditional police power test,55 the
Court "describe[d] the condition for abridgment of property rights
through the police power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate
State interest." 56 As applied by the Court, the test requires searching
scrutiny of both the ends served by governmental action 57 as well as the
means used to achieve those ends.58 Although the California Coastal
Commission had found that the proposed construction would result in
" 'increase[d] private use [of the shorefront] immediately adjacent to
public tidelands'" and had concluded that the required easement would
alleviate concomitant " 'adverse impacts on the public's ability to trav-
erse the shoreline,' "59 the Court disregarded the Commission's stated
concern regarding increased private use of the shoreline and instead lim-
ited the legitimate governmental objective to the preservation of "visual
access" to the beach. 60 And, once the Court had zeroed in on this nar-
row purpose, it dismissed as a "play on words" the Commission's argu-
ment that an easement permitting lateral access legitimately served that
goal. 61
52 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44.
53 Id.
54 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
55 107 S. Ct. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978)).
56 107 S. Ct. at 3150 (emphasis in original) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)
(land use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests")).
57 107 S. Ct. at 3146 (quoting from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978) (land use regulations must be "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose") (emphasis added)).
58 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
59 107 S. Ct. at 3155 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting the Commission's report in support of
the permit condition).




The Court's rough handling of the Commission's stated ends and
the means used to further them prompted cries of protest from fourJus-
tices. Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, objected
that the "Court imposes a standard of precision for the exercise of a
State's police power that has been discredited for the better part of this
century." 62 Justice Blackmun stated that the decision was "an anomaly"
because "a State's exercise of its police power need be no more than
rationally based." 63 Justice Stevens, for his part, decried the impact of
the decision on the "flexibility" of government agencies.64 The majority,
however, was unmoved by these invocations of modern orthodoxy.65
The Court had gleaned from prior cases a requirement that land use reg-
ulations "substantially" advance legitimate state interests, 66 and the
Court was "inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective."
67
The grammatical care evidenced by the Court in Nollan raises several
troubling issues. First, does the rigorous "police power" test adopted in
the case really flow from the takings clause, rather than the due process
clause? Next, assuming that the analysis does proceed from the takings
clause, does it impose significant restraints on governmental action (or,
put another way, does it provide any substantial protection for property
rights)? Finally, if the Court's test does, in fact, nullify governmental ac-
tion that would escape a more traditional takings clause analysis, is it
subject to the same fatal criticisms that brought down Lochner v. New
York?68
The precise provenance and legitimacy of the strict "police power"
analysis embraced by the majority in Nollan is uncertain. Prior cases chal-
lenging land use regulations have suggested that the traditional
"means/ends" analysis is a limitation inherent in the due process
clause. 69 Accordingly, Nollan's conclusion that the test flows from the
62 107 S. Ct. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Interestingly enough, the dissenters and the majority in Nollan switch sides on the police
power issue when the substantive constitutional question before the Court involves individual rather
than property rights. Justice Rehnquist, for example, relied upon the police power arguments mar-
shalled in Nollan byJustices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens to dissent from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Other members of the Nollan majority have also criti-
cized the application of a strict "means/ends" test in privacy cases. City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by White, J.,
and Rehnquist, J.) (arguing that state regulation that does not "unduly burden" the abortion deci-
sion should be upheld if "the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose"). This in-
consistency may suggest that the Nollan majority is willing to accord property rights the same exalted
status that the dissenters bestow upon so-called "fundamental" rights. Cf. Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981). Whether this is a welcome development is
debatable. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
66 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
67 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
68 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
69 For example, in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), the Court stated that the
question whether land use regulations exceeded "a valid exercise of the . . . police power" was
governed by "the familiar standard of 'reasonableness.'" The cases cited in Goldblatt (369 U.S. at
594-95) to support that conclusion, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), and Sproles v. Binford,
286 U.S. 374 (1932), establish a standard of bare rationality under the due process clause. See also
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2399 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that land use regulations may "unfairly deprive a citizen of the right
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takings clause is somewhat problematic. Moreover, even if one assumes
that the "means/ends" test derives from the takings clause, earlier opin-
ions have never suggested that there are any important analytical differ-
ences between a due process "means/ends" test and a similar line of
inquiry under the property clause. 70 A standard "means/ends" analysis,
of course, only requires a "rational" relationship between stated means
and ends.71 Thus, the Court's sudden emphasis upon a "substantial"
connection between means and ends seems dubious at best.
Nevertheless, the Court in Nollan proceeded under the assumption
that a rigorous "means/ends" test is required by the takings clause. In-
deed, the Court expressly defended its searching analysis of means and
ends by turning aside Justice Brennan's assertion that police power stan-
dards under the takings clause are "the same as those applied to due
process or equal-protection claims." 72 Accordingly, whatever prior law
suggested, the takings clause now requires that government regulation
bear a substantial relation to a legitimate state interest.
73
to develop his property at the time and in the manner that will best serve his economic interests,"
but stating that "it is the due process rather than [the takings clause] that protects the property
owner from improperly motivated, unfairly conducted, or unnecessarily protracted governmental
decision making"); Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due
Process or a Taking IWithoutJust Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315, 319-27 (1979) (describing due
process limitations on land use regulations); Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New
Direction in Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 1569, 1570 (1977) (describing the "police power" and
"takings" analyses as "disjunctive").
70 The A'ollan Court asserted that "our verbal formulations [of the police power test] in the
takings field have generally been different" from the standard due process analysis. 107 S. Ct. at
3147 n.3. The Court, in fact, went so far as to claim that "our opinions do not establish that [police
power] standards are the same [under the takings clause] as those applied to due process or equal
protection claims." Id. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), however, demon-
strates that these assertions, if not inaccurate, are at the very least hyperbole. In Schad, the Court
stated that '[w]here property interests are adversely affected" by land use regulations "the courts
generally have emphasized the breadth of municipal power to control land use and have sustained
the regulation if it is rationally related to legitimate state concerns ...." 452 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
That formulation, of course, is not "quite different" from the standards "applied to due process...
claims." A'ollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3. See also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 163 (1980) (government may "deny the property owner of some beneficial use of his
property" if the exaction is "reasonably related" to the promotion of "the general welfare").
The two cases cited by the Nollan Court in support of its strict takings clause analysis, further-
more, do not uniformly state a police power test differing from the standard due process analysis.
While Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 260, does require a "substantial" connection between
means and ends, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978), states only
that specified means must "reasonably" further a "substantial 'public' purpose." Thus, although
both cases use the adjective "substantial," the word is used differently each time: in Agins the adjec-
tive specifies the connection between means and ends, in Penn Central the adjective modifies the
importance of the governmental interest required in the first place. Such inconsistent usage raises
considerable doubt that the Court-in either case-thought it was formulating a test under the tak-
ings clause which departed from the due process "reasonableness" standard previously announced
for land use regulations. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. at 594-95.
71 .Vollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
73 107 S. Ct. at 3147. A'ollan, arguably, is not the first case in recent years to invalidate govern-
ment action under a "means/ends" takings analysis. An earlier takings case, Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), appears to have been decided on police power
grounds. There, the Court invalidated a state statute which appropriated all interest earned on in-
terpleader funds deposited in court. The exaction of the interest was in addition to a statutory fee
for services rendered in managing the fund, and the state offered no "police power justification" for
its action. 449 U.S. at 163. Although the Court's precise rationale is somewhat unclear, it appears
the appropriation was unconstitutional because "the exaction [was] a forced contribution to general
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The next important question therefore becomes whether Nollan's
rigorous "means/ends" requirement will have any significant substantive
impact. That query, of course, cannot be answered with any precision at
this point. But, despite the rather startling result in Nollan, the opinion
may become nothing more than an interesting footnote in future cases.
Nollan does not hold that the California Coastal Commission may not
take an easement without paying compensation - the case merely holds
that the Commission cannot take an easement permitting lateral passage
across beachfront property on the theory that the easement increases vis-
ual access. Thus, so long as a regulatory agency clearly articulates how a
particular exaction furthers specifically articulated ends, the barrier er-
ected in Nollan should be overcome. Indeed, the Court stated that, while
the California Coastal Commission's lateral access requirement was de-
fective, "if [the condition had] consisted of the requirement that the Nol-
lans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose
sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere," the "condition
would.., be constitutional. ' 74 As a result, Justice Brennan's final evalu-
ation of the decision may well be accurate: "Fortunately, the Court's de-
cision... will probably have little ultimate impact" because government
regulators "should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing [their]
expertise to demonstrate a specific connection between" chosen means
and ends.
75
A gambler, however, would be hesitant to place her stake on Justice
Brennan's prediction of the future. In response to Justice Brennan's as-
sessment, the majority retorted that "[w]e view the fifth amendment's
property clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance
with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination." 76
The decision in Nollan, moreover, itself demonstrates how far the Court
will go in rejecting proffered regulatory rationales as mere "cleverness
and imagination."' 77 The California Coastal Commission, after all, had
expressly found that the Nollans' home would result in increased private
use of the shoreline to the detriment of the general public's ability to use
non-privately owned tidelands, and had accordingly concluded that the
required easement bore a significant relation to the legitimate end of
protecting the public's right of access to public property. 7a That a major-
ity of the Court was predisposed to dismiss all of this as "a play on the
governmental revenues, and it [was] not reasonably related to the costs of using the courts." Id.
But, while Hebb's Fabulous Pharmacies apparently used a "means/ends" analysis, the mode in which
the analysis was carried out bears little resemblance to Nollan. The Court required only a "reason-
able" relation between means and ends, and the Court - contrary to the approach in Nollan (107 S.
Ct. at 3148-49) - did not reject or closely scrutinize a proffered regulatory rationale. On the con-
trary, "[n]o police power justification [was], offered for the deprivation" at issue in the case. 449
U.S. at 163.
74 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
75 Id. at 3161 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 3150.
77 Id.
78 107 S. Ct. at 3155 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting order of California Coastal Commission).
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word 'access,' -79 suggests that the "ultimate impact" of the Nollan test
may not be "little." ' 0
If the new "means/ends" test in fact invalidates government regula-
tion affecting the use and ownership of property that previously escaped
constitutional scrutiny, one is left to wonder why the Court has suddenly
seized upon an approach rarely used to any effect in prior cases, and
whether the analysis, so used, is jurisprudentially sound. The answers to
both inquiries are related.
There are, of course, many possible explanations for the Court's
sudden fascination with the fit between legislative means and ends. Per-
haps the most obvious, however, is the Court's inability to come up with
a fully satisfactory takings clause analysis. As will be addressed in the
next section of this Article, the Court has had dismal success in affording
property owners any real protection under the substantive provisions of
the clause. Virtually any governmental action (short of actual physical
appropriation) passes constitutional scrutiny.8' The multiple factor tak-
ings analysis adopted by the Court, moreover, is cumbersome and diffi-
cult.8 2 In these circumstances, the attraction of a strict "means/ends"
test is obvious. Despite the disadvantages of the analysis,83 the liberta-
rian aspects of a rigorous "means/ends" test might prove particulary ap-
pealing to those seeking reinforcement of private property rights. Strict
judicial scrutiny of regulatory means and ends can be used to place cer-
tain rights (including the destruction of property rights without compen-
sation) beyond legislative control. The analysis, furthermore, is
relatively straightforward and uncomplicated; the Court need only an-
nounce that given "means" do not "substantially" further certain "ends"
- there is no need to wander indeterminately through several levels of
inquiry.
The possible virtues of the Nollan approach, however, should not
blind the Court to history. The utility and flexibility which are the chief
advantages of a strict "means/ends" test are also the doctrine's principal
drawbacks. The strict "means/ends" test used during the early decades
of this century plainly constricted the realm of legislative discretion even
in the absence of clear guidance from the constitutional text. It was open
to debate, for example, whether New York's restriction upon the number
of hours worked by bakers was wise or unwise, but the State's policy
choice was almost certainly not constitutionally proscribed.8 4 The Court
"has long since... discarded" the "doctrine that. . . due process autho-
79 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
80 107 S. Ct. at 3161 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
81 See infra notes 116-133.
82 See id.
83 A strict "means/ends" test creates a body of law that is relatively unpredictable. The substan-
tive due process cases, for example, left few clear guidelines. The demarcation between permissible
and impermissible state regulation was difficult to perceive orjustify. Compare Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (invalidating limit on number of hours bakers could work) with Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (sustaining state law limiting the hours miners could work
underground).
84 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 57. There is, after all, nothing in the constitution which
speaks directly to the length of a baker's work day.
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rizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legisla-
ture has acted unwisely," 85 and the Court should hesitate before
recycling that discredited analysis. A strict "means/ends" analysis under
the takings clause raises once again the specter of judicial legislation: a
judgment that a given land use regulation does not "substantially" fur-
ther particular ends, in effect, simply supplants a legislative or executive
policy determination with a judicially determined substitute. There is as
little justification for that result under the takings clause as under the due
process clause.
8 6
The Court, as the opinions in Nollan demonstrate, is intimately
aware of the argument that a strict "means/ends" test unduly intrudes
upon legislative discretion. The argument, in fact, has been used by
some members of the Nollan majority to criticize "fundamental rights"
decisions supported by the Nollan dissenters.8 7 The Nollan dissenters, in
turn, have now invoked the same reasoning to decry the searching scru-
tiny of the Nollan majority. 8 The willingness of individual Justices to
criticize - or embrace - a strict "means/ends" analysis depending
upon the substantive constitutional right involved is not only somewhat
disingenuous,8 9 it demonstrates the illegitimacy of the analysis in the first
place. Privacy rights may (or may not) be more "fundamental" than
property rights, but it is hardly clear why a rigorous "means/ends" analy-
sis is any more or less appropriate in one instance than the other. In
reality, the ad hoc assignment of a strict "means/ends" test to some, but
not all, constitutional rights probably reflects the predilections of indi-
vidual Justices. Privacy rights and property rights either do - or do not
- receive heightened "means/ends" scrutiny depending upon where the
particular rights fall within an individual jurist's hierarchy of values.
That, of course, is precisely the reason why the process is objectionable:
it relegates the Court to an ad hoc policymaking body, thereby usurping
the primary function of a legislature in a democratic society.
A strict "means/ends" approach not only intrudes upon legislative
policymaking functions, it also provides little concrete protection for
property rights and even less guidance to government regulators. In-
deed, Nollan, provides no sound comfort either to citizens invoking the
85 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
86 My criticism of a strict "means/ends" test under the takings clause should not be taken to
imply that courts must completely foreswear any examination of means and ends. There are legiti-
mate limits on the exercise of the police powers. Courts, for example, must be ready to set aside
arbitrary or capricious government action. E.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 163 (1980) (striking down a statute appropriating all interest earned on accounts deposited
with a state court because the exaction "is not reasonably related to the costs of using the courts").
The threshold for judicial intervention, however, is a showing of irrationality; it is not enough to
argue that the legislature or executive has not acted wisely. In the vast arena of social and economic
legislation, courts ordinarily should not invalidate legislative or executive action just because other
"means" may more "substantially" further given "ends." E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
87 E.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by White, J., and Rehnquist,J.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3151 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 3163 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
89 See supra note 65.
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fifth amendment's property clause or to government regulators attempt-
ing to abide by its dictates. The case, for example, would be of little use
to the hypothetical property owners described at the start of this Article
because it is unlikely that either of them could successfully assert that the
respective appropriations of their property (whether vegetable garden or
developable air space) did not "substantially" further stated governmen-
tal objectives (whether building a highway or preservation of a mountain
view). 90 The case, moreover, gives just as little aid to government regu-
lators. Nollan does not inform government regulators of the factors that
transform their actions into a "taking," nor does the opinion even unam-
biguously declare that government cannot take property without paying
just compensation 9 ' - Nollan merely teaches that property can be taken
without compensation only when the Court agrees that the exaction sub-
stantially furthers legitimate ends.
The above factors suggest that a strict "means/ends" analysis will
not clarify the takings clause's garbled constitutional plot. Rigorous
scrutiny of the means and ends of government action simply will not en-
sure a happy ending for either property owners or government regula-
tors. If, as this Article suggests, takings clause values deserve more
rigorous protection than they are currently accorded, the Court should
provide that protection by shoring up the substantive protections of the
clause itself - not by making "scientific precision [in the fit between gov-
ernmental means and ends] a criterion of consitutional power .... -92
III. Going "Too Far": Is Nothing Out of Bounds?
The "means/ends" limitation addressed above does not exhaust the
Constitution's protection against uncompensated appropriation of pri-
vate property. If it did, wholesale government confiscation would escape
constitutional scrutiny so long as the government clearly articulated how
a particular exaction furthered the public welfare.93 It is necessary,
therefore, to examine when particular governmental means constitute a
"taking" even though employed for the most redoubtable of ends. This
second level of the "takings" analysis has proven to be exceedingly
difficult.
The fundamental precepts governing the second level of the current
takings analysis were set out in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.94 There,
after balancing private property rights against public necessity, the Court
invalidated a Pennsylvania statute which required underground coal
90 The developer challenging the mountain view ordinance could conceivably put on evidence
that there is no view from his property worthy of protection or that the ordinance would not, in fact,
preserve whatever view exists. Such an approach, however, would constitute a direct challenge to
the wisdom of the ordinance and, unless Nollan is given an exceedingly broad reading, would almost
certainly be rebuffed. See Landmark Land Co. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1285-86
(Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed sub nom. Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987).
91 Nollan intimates that if the California Coastal Commission wants to preserve "visual access"
to the beach, it may require the NoIlans to erect a viewing spot on their property. 107 S. Ct. at 3148-
49.
92 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932).
93 E.g., Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
94 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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mine operators to leave pillars of coal in place to prevent surface subsi-
dence. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, noted that although the
'takings clause gives "seemingly absolute protection" to the property
owner by providing that property "shall not be taken for [public] use
without compensation, " 95 the government must have some ability to act
without paying every adversely affected property owner.96 Accordingly,
property rights are "qualified by the police power." 97 That qualification,
however, must be carefully hedged against "the natural tendency of
human nature.., to extend the qualification more and more until at last
private property disappears." 98 Thus, Justice Holmes wrote, the "gen-
eral rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 99
Applying the above principles to the facts before him, Justice
Holmes found that the Pennsylvania statute constituted a taking. "'For
practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it' " and
the Pennsylvania statute had the effect of making it "commercially im-
practicable to mine certain coal." 10 0 The fact that the statute was passed
to promote the public welfare-i.e., to prevent subsidence-was not suf-
ficient to save the enactment. "[A] strong public desire to improve the
public condition," wrote Justice Holmes, "is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of pay-
ing for the change." 10 1
Justice Brandeis penned a vigorous dissent. The subsidence statute,
he argued, did not interfere with the physical possession of property but
merely restricted a "noxious use," and "the legislature has power to pro-
hibit such uses without paying compensation." 10 2 The "noxious use"
analysis, derived from earlier cases which had upheld land use regula-
tions under a nuisance rationale,10 3 was given extremely broad scope by
Justice Brandeis: so long as property "remains in the [physical] posses-
sion of its owner," government has an unquestioned right to "prevent[]
the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of
the public." °10 4 Therefore, in Justice Brandeis' view, if there is no physi-
cal dispossession and the "paramount rights of the public" are involved,
a governmental restriction upon the use of property does not constitute a
95 260 U.S. at 415.
96 Id. at 413 ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law").
97 Id. at 415.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 260 U.S. at 414 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820 (1917)).
101 260 U.S. at 416.
102 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
103 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
104 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandies, J., dissenting). Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 n.30 (1978) (noting that the "noxious use" cases are better understood as
resting "not on any supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that
the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of the policy... expected to produce
a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property").
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taking even if the regulation "deprives the owner of the only use to which
the property can then be profitably put."' 10 5
The majority and dissenting opinions in Mahon well illustrate the
tensions inherent in the Court's takings clause jurisprudence. As Justice
Holmes noted, seemingly absolute property rights must be subject to
some measure of uncompensated police power regulation or effective
government will cease. 10 6 The difficulty arises in delimiting-this police
power qualification somewhat short of the point, arguably reached by
Justice Brandeis, 10 7 at which "private property disappears."'10 8 The
Holmes/Brandeis debate has provided fertile ground for disputation.109
Justice Holmes' approach, however, has not prospered. While the
Court's taking clause cases since Mahon have often posed the Holmesian
inquiry, "has government regulation gone too far?,"' 110 the answer has
most often been the one supplied by Justice Brandeis.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,"'I the court recog-
nized that "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of
the fifth amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable diffi-
culty."''112 The court nevertheless stated that, while there was no " 'set
formula' " for determining when a taking has occurred, prior decisions
"have identified several factors that have particular significance."
' "13
These factors, drawn from "the major eminent domain cases decided by
[the] court," 114 include "the character of the governmental action," the
''economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and the "extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations."''115 This multiple factor analysis, applied in Penn Central to
sustain New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law against fifth
amendment challenge, has become the focus of recent takings clause
jurisprudence.1 6
105 260 U.S. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106 260 U.S. at 413.
107 260 U.S. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108 260 U.S. at 415.
109 Compare, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 128-38 (1978) (up-
holding a landmark preservation act against the contention that it goes "too far") with id. at 142-53
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that the act constitutes a taking).
110 260 U.S. at 415.
111 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
112 Id. at 123.
113 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
114 438 U.S. at 142 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115 438 U.S. at 124.
116 E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (the "charac-
ter of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking," there is no
evidence that the regulation "makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their busi-
ness," and there has been no "undue interference with their investment-backed expectations"); Ho-
del v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2082 (1987) (takings analysis turns upon "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries ... such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable invest-
ment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action' ") (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
225 (1986) (setting out the Penn Central test as having "particular significance"); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (setting out Penn Central test); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (court implicitly analyzes the Penn Central factors, noting that the'
government action did not result in a "physical invasion" or completely obliterate property values).
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The Penn Central test, at first blush, appears to offer some protection
to property owners against untrammeled regulatory action. The test, af-
ter all, suggests that whether a taking has occurred will depend upon a
realistic appraisal of the actual impact of regulatory action on the prop-
erty owner. The Penn Central factors, however, have been construed in a
manner reminiscent of Justice Brandeis' assertion that, so long as prop-
erty "remains in the [physical] possession of its owner," virtually any reg-
ulation taken to further the "paramount rights of the public" escapes
constitutional scrutiny." 7 Thus, while the Supreme Court has recog-
nized a taking any time the character of the government action is such
that the property owner is physically dispossessed,'" 8 the court has not
been as prompt to the rescue when the government merely binds and
gags the property owner. 1" 9
Indeed, the Court's analysis of the Penn Central factors has become
quite summary. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ,120 for exam-
ple, the Court simply noted that the "nature of the governmental action"
does not "constitute a taking requiring Government compensation" if
"the Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate
any of the [property owner's] assets for its own use" and the regulation
at issue "adjusts the benefits .and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good."' 12 The Court's analysis of the economic impact of
regulation upon the property owner, as well as its inquiry into interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations, has been similarly undemand-
117 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (physical in-
stallation of television cables on apartment building results in a taking; when there is "a permanent
physical occupation, a taking has occurred"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979)
(government mandated right of pubic access to private marina constitutes a taking because the servi-
tude "will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina"); United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1947) (when the government takes part of a tract of land by flood-
ing, it must pay for the damage caused by resulting erosion to the rest of the tract); United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 326-29 (1917) (construction of locks and dams that periodically flooded prop-
erty results in a partial taking of the property); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-70 (1903)
(when government floods property, the resulting physical dispossession of the owner results in a
compensable taking); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1893) (placement of
telegraph poles upon property results in a taking because the poles "effectually and permanently
dispossess[]" the property owner); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1872)
("where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other
material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its
usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution"). Cf United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (military overflights of chicken farm resulted in a taking because the effect of
the flights on the property owners was "as complete as if the United States had entered upon the
surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it").
119 See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (Court declines to
address whether a regulation limiting prime residential property solely to agricultural use constitutes
a taking); Williamson Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (court
declines to address whether various land use regulations constitute a taking even though the jury
had concluded that the regulations denied the property owner any economically viable use of its
land); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Court declines to
consider whether zoning regulation limiting industrial property to "open space" uses constitutes a
taking); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (Court concludes that change in zoning ordi-
nance which prohibited high-density development, thereby injuring property owners by as much as
$2 million, did not constitute a taking).
120 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
121 Id. at 225.
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ing. In Penn Central, the Court wrote that its prior cases "uniformly reject
the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can
establish a 'taking' " - and the Penn Central Court insisted on analyzing
economic impact "standing alone."' 122 Moreover, while the concept of
investment-backed expectations would seem to require the fact finder to
delve into the disappointed expectations of the property owner, the Penn
Central Court rejected "the submission that appellants may establish a
'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to ex-
ploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available
for development."'' 23 Thus, for all practical purposes, the Court dis-
missed "economic impact" and "investment-backed expectations" as po-
tent inquiries in the very case that formally established them as analytical
factors. The feeble nature of the inquiries was confirmed in Andrus v.
Allard,124 where the Court concluded that the owners of valuable native
American artifacts could be stripped of their right to sell or trade those
items - even though the regulation destroyed the market value of the
artifacts as well as the investment-backed expectations of their owners. 125
The fact that the government action rendered extremely valuable objects
"priceless" in a dramatically literal sense did not raise serious constitu-
tional concern.
The impact of the Court's contemporary takings clause analysis
upon property owners has been dramatic. The factors identified in Penn
Central have become a legal litany, but they have not been given any real
muscle. 126 Government, it seems, can confiscate all practical value inher-
ent in property so long as the regulation "involves the adjustment of
rights for the public good," 127 leaves the property owner in physical pos-
session of the property involved, 128 and does not "extinguish a funda-
mental attribute of ownership."' 129 The protection this approach accords
property values is not substantial. Government regulation, by definition,
almost always involves a "strong public desire to improve the public con-
dition."' 130 Moreover, government regulations which result in the physi-
cal invasion of private property "are relatively rare."' 13 1 The only
"fundamental attributes of ownership" recognized by the Court to date
are physical possession or some closely associated right - such as the
right to donate, devise or (in some circumstances) exclude others from
property. 3 2 Thus, under the Court's current analysis, government regu-
122 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
123 Id. at 130.
124 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
125 See 444 U.S. at 64-68.
126 See infra note 153.
127 444 U.S. at 65.
128 Id. at 66.
129 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
130 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
131 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2393
(1987) (Stevens, J:, dissenting).
132 Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (1987) (striking down as a "taking" the complete
abrogation of the right to devise certain interests in Indian allotment lands; "[iun one form or an-
other, the right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-
American legal system since feudal times"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80
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lation will not exceed the strictures of the takings clause-whatever the
practical impact of the regulation upon the property owner-so long as
the property owner retains the right to "possess," "transport," or "do-
nate or devise" an otherwise valueless shell.' 33 With such an analytical
framework, very little government regulation-to borrow Justice
Holmes' turn of phrase-goes "too far."'
3 4
The jurisprudence surveyed above indicates that the owner of the
hypothetical vegetable garden described at the start of this Article will
receive compensation; she has been physically displaced from a small
section of her backyard. The developer, on the other hand, will receive
nothing: the mountain view ordinance furthers the public interest, the
landowner still physically possesses her property, and she has lost no
"fundamental attribute of ownership."' 3 5 Accordingly, the developer
has no constitutional complaint-even though she has lost a significant
property interest. These results are problematic.'
3 6
It is difficult to justify why a vegetable garden lost to the commuting
public should invariably and without question result in a "taking" with
concomitant "just compensation" while millions of dollars in develop-
ment rights lost in the name of public aesthetics are not compensable.
To say, as Professor Sax has suggested in a well-known analysis of the
issue, that the results are required because the government is acting in its
role as a "proprietor" when it builds a road, while it is merely "arbitrat-
ing" the interests of the developer and nearby residents when it appro-
priates a scenic easement, is hardly satisfactory.' 3 7 If compensation is
(1979) (holding that "the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right, falls within [the] category of interests that the Government cannot take without com-
pensation") (footnote omitted). Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980)
(shopping center's reliance on "right to exclude" persons circulating petitions rejected; "appellants
have failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic
value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking' ").
133 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
134 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Indeed, this past term the Court sustained a Pennsylvania
subsidence statute that, under any realistic analysis, is virtually identical to the one invalidated in
Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). See Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, I B.Y.U.J. PUB. L. 261, 287-96
(1987).
135 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
136 Not everyone, however, is troubled. The apparent rule established by the Court's cases -
i.e., that physical dispossession constitutes a taking while anything short of that does not - is sup-
ported by some commentators. See Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFFALO L.
REV. 735, 831 (1985) ("My recommendation is that the takings clause should be restricted to a small
variety of cases in which the government acquires real property ownership, possession or full control
(restrictions on use would never be takings) for government projects that service the public.") (foot-
note omitted); Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public
Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982) (arguing that physical dispossession is the dividing line between
permissible regulation and a taking). Cf Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WAsH. L.
REV. 553, 597 (1972) (arguing that the power of eminent domain should be essentially unlimited).
137 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964). Professor Sax:
distinguishes between government's proprietary role, when appropriations of private prop-
erty result in a benefit to a government enterprise such as the military or school and high-
way construction, and government's arbital [sic] role as mediator among competing
economic claims. If private property is appropriated in the course of government's role as
proprietor, then compensation is due, but if government only mediates and resolves con-
flicts among the competing interests of its citizens, consequential losses to private property
owners are a noncompensable consequence of the police power.
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required when the government condemns a vegetable garden to build a
road that benefits the general public, why isn't the argument for compen-
sation even stronger when-as in the case of the developer's lost air
space-government action burdens a property owner to benefit a dis-
crete segment of the public (citizens who would rather have a view of the
mountains than a commercial development)?
138
The disparate outcomes for the vegetable garden owner and the de-
veloper can be justified pragmatically. Indeed, the Court's pronounced
reticence to find that anything short of physical ouster constitutes a tak-
ing may be a direct (but unstated) result of fiscal concerns - the public
can afford to buy vegetable gardens to build roads, but society simply
cannot raise enough money to pay for all the scenic beauty it desires.
That government cannot afford everything it would like to accomplish is
a widely recognized modern reality. That reality, however, is not a sound
constitutional foundation upon which to erect a modern takings clause
jurisprudence because the support it provides for property rights gives
way precisely when needed the most. If the unstated rationale for refus-
ing the developer compensation is that public scenic easements, while
desirable, come too dear, the fifth amendment is indeed a strange consti-
tutional shield: it protects the private property owner unless and until
things become too expensive for the government. The takings clause, as
such, becomes not a bulwark against governmental oppression, but
rather a hurdle the government surmounts by sadly turning its pockets
inside out. This result is objectionable. The contemporary government
desire to "regulate more and spend less" 1 39 should not automatically in-
vest regulators seeking "to improve the public condition" with "a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."'
140
A positivist property analysis leads to a final possible rationale for
the compensated gardener and disappointed developer. As Justice Bren-
nan noted in his dissent in Nollan, property law "as a general proposi-
tion" is "left to the individual States to develop and administer."'
4 1
Taken for all it is worth, this and similar statements suggest that property
and property rights have no independent existence outside of state
law. 142 And, if state law indeed defines and delimits property rights, no
Note, Devines v. Maier: An Unwelcome Positivist Intrusion Upon Traditional Taking Analysis, 46 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 845, 852-53 (1985). See also Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 161-
62 (1971).
138 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensa-
tion Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1201 (1967). It is, moreover, not entirely clear how Professor Sax
would classify the developer's case. The argument could be made that, in condemning a scenic
easement across the developer's property, the government was acting in a proprietary capacity. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 71 (1964).
139 Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 B.Y.U.J. PuB. L. 261, 264 (1987).
140 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 293, 416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
141 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3158 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
(quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart,J., concurring)). See also Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
142 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982) (upholding the Indiana Dormant
Mineral Interests Act against the claim that the reversion provision of the Act constituted a taking
withoutjust compensation; "we have no doubt that,just as a State may create a property interest that
is entitled to constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition the permanent retention
of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention
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regulatory measure short of actual physical dispossession of the owner
could constitute a taking - the regulation would, in effect, simply rede-
fine, not take, property. 143 Thus, the owner of the garden receives com-
pensation as a result of her physical ouster. The developer, by contrast,
receives nothing because she only possesses the property rights that the
state deigns to accord her - and the state has changed its mind.
Although the Court has seemingly embraced the positivist approach
described above when the constitutional question before it is whether a
property right has been deprived without due process of law, 144 similar
analysis under the takings clause is troubling. The fifth amendment, by
its literal terms, states that "private property" shall not "be taken for
public use, without just compensation."'145 Although the takings clause
"has not always been read literally,"' 46 the wording of the clause sug-
gests - at the very minimum - that "private property" is not subject to
unfettered state control. Indeed, unquestioned adoption of the positivist
notion that "private property" consists only of those interests that are
accorded the owner by legislative grace would render the takings clause a
dead letter. Justice Holmes noted over sixty years ago that property val-
ues "are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power."'147 But, as he emphasized, that implied limitation "must have its
limits" or "private property disappears."'' 48 Property interests, even if
"not created by the Constitution,"'' 49 must nevertheless be protected by
it.150
IV. Clarifying the Analysis: Can the Court Mean What It Says?
In a much-heralded decision this past Term, the Court declared that
even temporary regulatory takings require just compensation.' 5' The
to retain the interest"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing which prop-
erty interests in employment contracts require pretermination hearing; "Property interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are de-
fined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law -
rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.").
143 Cf. Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 816
(1986) (while a property owner has a right to "participate in... collective decisionmaking," liberty
interests do not "dictate the existence of any particular set of economic opportunities" or "require
unrestricted individual opportunities to engage in exchange transactions").
144 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (school district must provide adequate pro-
cess prior to suspending students; "[h]aving chosen to extend the right to an education to people of
appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fun-
damentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred"); Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (when property interest is created by ordinance or implied contract, any
claim of entitlement to the interest must be decided by reference to state law); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1974) (plurality opinion) (statute which granted an employee the right not to
be discharged except for "cause" also provided the procedures by which "cause" is to be deter-
mined and supersedes the constitutional due process guarantees claimed by the employee).
145 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
146 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
147 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
148 Id. at 413, 415.
149 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
150 See Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981).
151 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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opinion, however, was rendered on the pleadings and did not address
the fundamental question whether a taking had actually occurred.
52
The case, therefore, simply establishes that property owners who suffer a
taking will obtain compensation; it does not clarify when, or under what
circumstances, a taking results. The preceding discussion shows that
such clarification is sorely needed.
As shown above, the Court's current takings clause analysis gives lit-
tle concrete protection to property owners. Although the Court has de-
duced a three-part test to probe the outer limits of permissible
government regulation, the inquiry has in fact collapsed into a search for
physical dispossession of the property owner or abrogation of rights
closely entwined with physical possession. 153 Such an analysis, of course,
is far too attenuated to prevent government regulators from going "too
far."' 54 Ironically, and despite the results it has reached, even the
Supreme Court has verbally rejected "the proposition that a 'taking' can
never occur unless government has [interfered with] physical control" of
property.15 5 The Court should bring its holdings in line with its rhetoric.
There are numerous possible ways for the Court to provide a coher-
ent policy for the takings clause. Prior commentators have made excel-
lent suggestions, ranging from the theoretical and philosophical 56 to the
152 The First English Evangelical plaintiff alleged that certain activities of the County of Los Ange-
les had resulted in a temporary taking of its property. The lower state courts, based on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), aff'd on other grounds,
447 U.S. 255 (1980), had sustained the defendant's demurrer to the complaint on the ground that,
even ifa "taking" had occurred, the plaintiffcould not obtain "just compensation" because the sole
remedy was a declaratory judgment action or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted review only
to determine whether the demurrer was properly sustained and accordingly had "no occasion to
decide whether the ordinance at issue" actually resulted in "a compensable taking." 107 S. Ct.
2384-85.
153 E.g., Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979).
154 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
155 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 n.25 (1978).
156 E.g., Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981);
Michelman, Ilh. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296
(1980); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensa-
tion " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). See also R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that ajudge can objectively determine the meaning of
the takings clause by construing its language in accordance with its commonly accepted meaning at
the time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, with specific reference to the philosophy
ofJohn Locke); Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV,
741, 816 (1986) (Professor Baker suggests that property rights are essentially political rights;
"[wihile a formal conception of liberty encompasses the right to participate in... collective decision-
making, it does not dictate the existence of any particular set of economic opportunities"); Bender,
The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 824, 828-29 (1985) (Professor
Bender suggests a hierarchical arrangement of property rights under which developmental property
rights would "increasingly yield to .. . community values and interests"); Oakes, "Property Rights" In
Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981) (analyzing the interaction of the contracts
clause, due process clause, and the takings clause in the protection of property rights); Radin, Prop-
erty and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (Professor Radin analyzes the feasibility and legiti-
macy of distinguishing between 'fungible property" and "personal property" as defined by their
relationship to personhood; she suggests that "fungible" property rights (such as investment inter-
ests that can be easily converted into dollar amounts) may be more readily taken than personal
property rights more closely associated with personality and autonomy); Rodgers, Bringing People
Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982)




practical.15 7 The Court, in fact, has gleaned at least a portion of its cur-
rent analysis from this commentary. 158 Despite the plethora of ap-
proaches recommended by the commentators, however, the Court
continues to reach ad hoc results, at least in part because of the concep-
tual difficulties of the academic proposals. The analysis set out here,
therefore, is derived from the Court's own construction of the takings
clause. 159 Indeed, I believe the Court has already sketched out a worka-
ble plot for the takings clause. Unfortunately, the Court has refused to
develop its own outline.
In Penn Central the Court identified a trio of factors that have "partic-
ular significance" under the takings clause.' 60 Those factors have been
repeatedly applied by the Court as its standard takings clause analysis. 16'
But, instead of giving each factor precise content and considering their
logical impact and interaction, the Court has disabled the Penn Central
test by giving each factor an extremely narrow focus and citing cases
which turn on one factor to dispose of an entirely different inquiry under
a separate factor. The only character of government action which raises
the Court's collective eyebrow, for example, is physical dispossession. 162
And, in reliance on cases which in fact turned on the character of the
157 E.g., Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36 (1964). As noted, Professor Sax makes a distinction between govern-
ment action taken in "proprietary" and "arbitral" roles. The approach, as he aptly demonstrates,
has certain practical appeal. Id. at 62-63. However, one quickly encounters significant difficulties in
distinguishing between "proprietary" and "arbitral" functions - and in justifying why proprietary
actions require compensation while arbitral functions do not. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1201
(1967); see also Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 223-26 (1974)
(Professor Berger suggests a series of pragmatic rules to determine when compensation under the
takings clause is appropriate; the specific rules are derived from an analysis of the expectations of the
property owner and the benefits and burdens accruing to the property owner and the public from
the challenged government action); Costonis, Presumptive And Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For
The Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 483-501 (1983) (Professor Costonis presents a model under
which certain physical incursions and regulatory actions taken by the government would presump-
tively establish a taking; the government could overcome the presumption based on fairness consid-
erations); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE LJ. 385, 418-24
(1977) (suggesting that questions include whether government action abates a nuisance, whether its
costs exceed its benefits, and whether the costs of paying compensation exceed the burdens placed
on the property owner).
158 One of the Penn Central factors, the impact of government regulation upon a property owner's
"distinct investment-backed expectations" (Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295
(1981)), apparently derives from the writings of Professor Michelman. Professor Michelman,
describing the holding in Penns 'ylvania Coal, stated that the takings test established by that case was
"whether or not the [governmental] measure in question can easily be seen to have practically de-
prived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expecta-
tion." Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).
159 Much of the extant literature has had little impact on the decided cases. See Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: ll'hy the Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 598 (1984) (Professor
Rose notes that, despite the multitude of academic proposals, courts essentially rely upon an ad hoc
analysis of takings claims; she suggests, among other things, that the courts "turn to ordinary lan-
guage as a guide for what constitutes a taking of property"). My analysis, built upon the "ordinary
language" of the Court's own opinions, is a pragmatic attempt to delineate the approach suggested
by Professor Rose.
160 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
161 See supra note 153.
162 See supra notes 127-33.
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government action, the Court has rarely been moved by assertions that
government action imposes undue economic burdens or improperly
hampers investment-backed expectations.1 63 As a result, Penn Central has
become something of a tautology - an analysis that the Court reflexively
invokes and quickly dispatches in the course of sustaining virtually any
government regulation challenged under the takings clause. This is un-
fortunate. Unless the takings clause is to be relegated to the constitu-
tional attic, the Court must demonstrate that the Penn Central factors have
real substance.
I believe that the Penn Central factors, if properly reinvigorated, can
provide property owners with significant constitutional protection. Re-
viving the takings clause under Penn Central, however, will require a mod-
est recasting of that case's three inquiries. The presence or absence of a
physical invasion, for example, should not be the sole relevant focus
when the Court scrutinizes the character of government action. Instead,
the Court should examine whether there is a compelling public need for
the government action and whether it results in a true average reciprocity
of advantage between affected property owners and the public. 164 The
economic diminution inquiry, in turn, should focus on whether the gov-
ernment action has deprived the property owner of a valuable, identifi-
able property interest - not on whether the government has taken
everything imaginable. The investment-backed expectation analysis, fi-
nally, should be used to determine whether compensation for a given
economic loss would be 'just" or merely a windfall. Under each factor,
the Court must temper its current willingness to approve any injury short
of total confiscation. Unless the character of the government action sup-
ports a different result, those regulatory actions which appropriate iden-
tifiable, valuable property interests that the owners legitimately expected
were available for use or development should result in compensation. In
short, I propose a construction of Penn Central that is rigorous enough to
make the takings clause a real-rather than simply a storied-constraint
on government action.
A. Character of the Governmental Action: Is the Public Need Compelling or Is
There an Average Reciprocity of Advantage?
"Many cases before and since Pennsylvania Coal have recognized that
the nature of the State's action is critical in takings analysis."' 65 The fo-
cus the modern Court has given to this factor, however, has been exceed-
ingly narrow. Although the Court's rhetoric has suggested the
contrary, 166 unless the character of the government action "reaches the
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation," the Court has been
163 See supra notes 124-26; iqfra notes 233-37.
164 This inquiry may alone be determinative in exceptional cases (Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)), but ordinarily an analysis
of economic diminution and investment-backed expectations also will be required.
165 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987).
166 E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 n. 25 (1978) ("we do not
embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical
control over a portion of a parcel").
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loath to find that "a taking has occurred." 167 This hesitancy is unwar-
ranted. While a physical invasion may represent the archetypal govern-
ment action requiring compensation, 168 the takings clause protects
against more than physical invasions. A careful analysis of the character
of the government action, therefore, must be given considerably broader
scope than is suggested by the Court's contemporary precedent.
Judicial insistence upon a physical invasion as the predicate for fifth
amendment protection has an analogue in the fourth amendment con-
text. Until relatively recently, the fourth amendment's protection against
"unreasonable searches and seizures ' 169 was limited to actual physical
invasions.' 70 As a result, electronic surveillance of private conversations
escaped constitutional scrutiny - unless the government happened to
cause a physical invasion by using a thumbtack to fasten the microphone
to the wall. 171 This formalistic approach was rightly criticized, 172 and
was ultimately abandoned by the Court. In Katz v. United States, 173 the
Court eschewed physical intrusion as a constitutional litmus test and in-
stead announced that the fourth amendment applies whenever police in-
vestigatory activities infringe an "expectation of privacy" that "society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "174 Thus, the Court moved from
a mechanical rule of thumb to an explicit, albeit more difficult,' 75 analysis
of the core concerns underlying the fourth amendment. A similar shift in
analysis is mandated under the takings clause.
Isolating the core concerns animating a constitutional provision is
no mean feat, of course. But, unlike the situation in Katz (where the
Court was compelled to erect a new privacy rationale for the fourth
amendment), the fundamental principles to guide construction of the
takings clause have already been identified by the Court. The Court sim-
ply seems to have mislaid them. Nearly 100 years ago, the Court de-
clared that the mission of the takings clause is to prevent the government
"from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the bur-
dens of government."' 176 When a property owner "surrenders to the
public something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned
to him." 177 The clause, in short, "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
167 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
168 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428.
169 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
170 Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ". An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1077, 1081-86 (1987). See generally Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (actual physical
intrusion required as predicate for a search); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (same
proposition); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (same proposition).
171 Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (the Court finds the predicate physical intrusion
required for fourth amendment protection because a microphone was attached to a wall with a
thumbtack).
172 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
174 Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
175 See generally Wilkins, supra note 170.
176 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
177 Id.
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and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 78 Thus, the
Court should explicitly analyze the character of government action to de-
termine whether the burdens created by that action, "in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'
179
Whether or not the costs of government action should be borne by
the public as a whole does not turn upon the form the action takes; i.e.,
whether the action results in a physical occupation or transfer of prop-
erty. The presence or absence of a "permanent physical occupation"'
80
is simply too blunt an analytical tool for that inquiry. 18 1 The inquiry,
however, does require an analysis of why the sovereign is acting as well as
a realistic appraisal of how the sovereign action affects the individual
property owner vis-A-vis the public. The character of government action,
therefore, should be scrutinized to determine (1) the justification for the
particular action and (2) the impact of the action upon individual prop-
erty owners and the general public. Explicit analysis of these issues
should indicate, with a significant degree of reliability, whether the gov-
ernment is "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens."'
182
The first issue relevant to the above analysis is potentially the most
troublesome. Judicial inquiry into the justification for government action
creates the danger, exemplified by Nollan, that courts will intrude upon
legislative or executive programs because they deem them unwise. 183
Some judicial inquiry into the justification for governmental action is re-
quired, however, if the takings clause is to have any substantive impact.
It is preferable, furthermore, that this inquiry be established as a focused,
substantive constitutional requirement. The "means/ends" test utilized
in Nollan, by contrast, has indeterminate breadth. Indeed, the Nollan ap-
proach differs little (if at all) from a substantive due process analysis,
8 4
while the inquiry I propose here (and the one suggested by the decided
cases) is relatively narrow: courts will essentially ask whether there is a
strong or a weak police power justification for given governmental ac-
tion. Governmental action possessing a compelling police power justifi-
cation will be more readily upheld against a takings challenge. Absence
of a compelling police power justification, moreover, is not automatically
fatal. On the contrary, governmental action lacking a strong police
power justification will be invalidated as a taking only if it lacks a true
average reciprocity of advantage and an analysis of its economic impact
and interference with investment-backed expectations demonstrates that
compensation is required. 185 Thus, the judicial inquiry proposed here
178 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
179 Id.
180 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
181 As the Court noted in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945),
"[tihe . . . deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the
sovereign constitutes that taking."
182 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
183 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. A strict scrutiny due process inquiry into the
justification for government action, of course, knows no bounds.
185 See infra notes 202-06. This is perhaps the biggest difference between the test I propose and
the "means/ends" analysis adopted in Nollan. As exemplified by that case, judicial disagreement
with the justification for challenged governmental action - without more - results in invalidation.
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does not create the same separation of powers difficulties as a strict
"'means/ends" test.
The various justifications for government actions adversely affecting
property owners lie along a continuum. The stronger the police power
justification for the action, the more likely the action will withstand a
challenge under the takings clause. Over a century ago, for example, the
Court "recognized that the government can prevent a property owner
from using his property to injure others without having to compensate
the owner for the value of the forbidden use."' 186 In Mugler v. Kansas,
187
which involved a challenge to a statute prohibiting use of a distillery, the
Court reasoned that the power of the state to prohibit uses of property
"prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not -
and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, can-
not be - burdened with the condition that the State must compensate
such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain."188 Thus,
the authority of government to act is at its strongest - and the counter-
vailing interests of affected property owners the weakest - when the
government acts to prevent property owners, "by a noxious use of their
property, to inflict injury upon the community."' 89 As a result, forbid-
ding the excavation of sand and gravel below the water line,' 90 prohibit-
ing the operation of a brickyard in a residential area, 19' interdicting the
operation of a livery stable in a downtown area,' 92 and the eradication of
trees carrying a disease inimical to a state's agricultural interests' 93 do
not constitute takings. As Professor Michelman has noted, "no one can
obtain a private vested right against regulation or improvement for the
sake of public health, safety or welfare."'
194
Government action does not escape scrutiny under the takings
clause, however, merely because some public purpose justifies that action.
Although government may act to further the public health, safety and
welfare, those concepts are not so broad that they swallow the takings
clause. As Justice Holmes noted, "[tlhe protection of private property in
the fifth amendment presupposes that it is wanted for a public use, but
provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation." 195
Thus, governmental power to limit the use of property without compen-
186 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887)).
187 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
188 Id. at 669.
189 Id.; see Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE LJ. 385,
418-24 (1977) (suggesting that the compensation issue, at least in part, should turn upon whether
government action abates a nuisance).
190 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
191 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
192 Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
193 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
194 Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1108 (1981).
195 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); cf Epstein, The Public Purpose
Limitation On The Power of Eminent Domain : .A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REv. 231,
264-65 (1984) (criticizing the broad definition of "public use" approved in Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981), which involved the condemnation
of a large residential and commercial neighborhood for construction of a General Motors assembly
plant, as "oppressive to property rights and to liberty").
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sating affected property owners "is not coterminous with the police
power itself."' 196 The Mfugler line of cases simply "does not grant carte
blanche to government agencies to regulate private property into obliv-
ion."' 197 Unless governmental action involves "prevention of a misuse or
illegal use" of property, 198 it does not - without further inquiry - escape
the requirements of the takings clause. In short, the public need must be
truly compelling before government action will receive the same deferen-
tial treatment accorded Mugler and its progeny.
199
The Court's most recent cases dangerously ignore the importance of
the police power justification for government action challenged under
the takings clause. Contemporary pronouncements of the Court suggest
that government actions taken to promote aesthetics are entitled to the
same deferential treatment accorded regulations prohibiting life-threat-
ening uses of property. In Penn Central, for example, the Court echoed
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal 200 by dramatically rereading
Mugler and its progeny to dispose of the contention that stricter constitu-
tional scrutiny is required if government regulation does not involve a
truly "noxious" use of property. "These cases," the Court asserted, "are
better understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious' quality of the
prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were rea-
sonably related to the implementation of a policy ... expected to pro-
duce a wide-spread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated
property." 20 ' This reading of Mugler, however, virtually repeals the tak-
ings clause. Under the analysis proposed by the Court, any regulation of
property rights - no matter how draconian - would pass constitutional
muster so long as the regulation produced a "wide-spread public bene-
fit" and did not unduly discriminate between property owners. As a re-
sult, a requirement that all checking account balances be invested in non-
interest bearing government bonds would be unobjectionable because
the regulation would apply to all users of checking accounts and would
reduce the national debt. This, of course, cannot be correct. 20 2 Govern-
ment actions bearing only a tenuous relation to public health and safety
do not stand on the same constitutional ground as regulations aimed di-
rectly at those core concerns. The Court's recent refusal to recognize
that fact is erroneous.
196 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
197 Berger, The 1"ear of the Taking Issue, I B.Y.U.J. PuB. L. 261, 279 (1987). At least one commen-
tator has suggested that .1lugler is essentially inconsistent with the analysis set out in Pennsylvania
Coal. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1059-69 (1980).
But, while there is tension between the cases, they are not in irreconcilable conflict. Mugler merely
establishes that the public necessities impelling some government actions are entitled to significant
weight.
198 Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911) (emphasis added).
199 It bears emphasis that a use does not become a "misuse" or "illegal use" simply because the
government has declared it so. In Curtin, 222 U.S. at 86, the Court held that the federal government,
by prohibiting the grazing of cattle on private land located within the boundaries of Yosemite Na-
tional Park, had taken property without just compensation.
200 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
201 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134 n.30.
202 See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (striking down as a taking a
statute which appropriated all interest earned on funds deposited with state courts).
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Mugler and related cases suggest that government action backed by a
compelling public need may, without more, withstand scrutiny under the
takings clause. If, however, government action lacks a compelling police
power justification-such as the abatement of a nuisance or a noxious
use of property-a court should undertake a careful analysis of the im-
pact the action has upon the individual property owner and the public at
large. Justice Holmes has again provided the key analytical element:
"various laws" adversely impacting the interests of individual property
owners can be sustained against a takings challenge so long as they "se-
cure[] an average reciprocity of advantage" for the property owner and
the public.20 3 Such an "average reciprocity of advantage" exists if, de-
spite the costs or losses imposed by the challenged government action,
the complaining property owner receives benefits in some rough, but ap-
proximately offsetting, proportion. The concept is similar to that which
sulpports the validity of so-called "special assessment taxes" (i.e., taxes
levied upon particular landowners to pay for the construction of public
improvements). While "moneys raised by general taxation may constitu-
tionally be applied to purposes from which the individual taxed may re-
ceive no benefit," special assessments "laid upon particular property
owners are ordinarily constitutional only if based on benefits received by
them." 204 Zoning ordinances, which often have a dramatic impact upon
the value of property held by individual owners but which nevertheless
broadly serve the collective interests of all property owners, are the para-
digm example of government action that generally passes muster under
an "average reciprocity of advantage" analysis.
20 5
The asserted justification for government action and the relative im-
pact of the action upon the property owner and the public at large do not
exist in separate, hermetically sealed compartments. The fact that the
government is acting to abate a serious nuisance will have a substantial
impact upon the "average reciprocity of advantage" inquiry. Indeed, the
Court has recently noted that when a state "restrains uses of property
that are tantamount to public nuisances," such action is "consistent with
the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage' . . . referred to in Pennsylvania
Coal." 20 6 The obverse is also quite true; if the government is acting to
preserve aesthetics-such as the unique architectural characteristics of an
individual building-the adversely affected property owner likely will not
receive in return anything even approximating the costs imposed upon
203 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
204 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1935); see also Nor-
wood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1898):
There is a point beyond which the legislative department, even when exerting the power of
taxation, may not go consistently with the citizen's right of property .... [T]he guarantees
for the protection of private property would be seriously impaired, if it were established as a
rule of constitutional law, that the imposition by the legislature upon particular private
property of the entire cost of a public improvement, irrespective of any peculiar benefits
accruing to the owner from such improvement, could not be questioned by him in the
courts of the country.
205 E.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (upholding citywide height limitations); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding general zoning ordinance).
206 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
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her.20 7 In such cases, courts should be especially sensitive to the claim
that a taking has occurred.
Application of the preceding criteria to the hypothetical landowners
set out at the start of this Article suggests that, in each case, the nature of
the government action raises serious constitutional concerns. While the
government is acting in furtherance of a strong police power interest in
building a road, the vegetable garden owner has been physically dispos-
sessed and has received little in the way of an offsetting "average reci-
procity of advantage" for the loss of her garden.20 8 The condemnation
of the scenic easement across the developer's property is equally suspect.
There, the government is not acting to abate a classic noxious use of
property. 209 The government, instead, is acting to further an aesthetic
goal: the preservation of a scenic view. And, while that police power
objective demands respect, the costs that it imposes upon the individual
property owner are not reduced in any significant degree by reciprocal
advantages. The public has demanded the benefit of an unrestricted
view across the developer's property and has accordingly imposed upon
the developer a sixty-five percent loss in property value. Any concrete
benefit flowing to the aggrieved property owner in these circumstances is
exceedingly hard to identify.
210
A realistic appraisal of the nature of government action, therefore, if
freed from reflexive reliance upon physical intrusion, gives both hypo-
thetical property owners constitutional comfort. Whether or not the de-
veloper will ultimately succeed on her takings claim, however, turns upon
an analysis of the economic impact of the government action and its in-
terference with her investment-backed expectations.
B. Economic Diminution: Has The Government Appropriated A Valuable,
Identifiable Property Interest?
The economic impact of government action upon a property owner
has obvious relevance to takings clause analysis. Because the primary
mission of the clause is to prevent government from "loading upon one
207 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his Penn Central dissent:
While zoning at times reduces individual property values, the burden is shared relatively
evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by
one aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another.
Here, however, a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on appellants; it is
uniquely felt and is not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400
other "landmarks" in New York City. Appellees have imposed a substantial cost on less
than one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in New York City for the general benefit of
all its people. It is exactly this imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the
"taking" protection is directed.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
208 Although the property owner as well as the public at large gain a new road, the property
owner's access to that road does not diminish in any significant degree the particularized costs im-
posed upon her.
209 The proposed office tower is in full compliance with all applicable (and long-standing) zoning
regulations.
210 One can argue, of course, that the developer, along with the public at large, "benefits" by the
unrestricted view of the mountains. But, compared with the millions of dollars in costs imposed
upon the property owner, whatever pleasure she may derive from the view hardly approximates a
real "average reciprocity of advantage."
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individual more than his just share of the burdens of government,"2 11 it
is essential to know precisely what costs have been thrust upon the prop-
erty owner by a challenged government action. But, while the relevance
of economic diminution is plain, its analytical force has waned considera-
bly since Justice Holmes authored Pennsylvania Coal. Recent decisions, in
fact, suggest that except in the most egregious circumstances economic
loss will have very little effect on the question whether a taking has oc-
curred.21 2 The takings clause, however, protects against more-than out-
rageous confiscations of property values. The Court, therefore, should
give this Penn Central factor more sensitive attention.
Until quite recently, courts frequently relied upon economic diminu-
tion to conclude that a particular government action required compensa-
tion. Courts declared that a taking occurred whenever government
action substantially diminished the use or value of property.2 13 Accord-
ing to these decisions, government action need not have destroyed every
reasonable use; rather, there was a taking if government action substan-
tially impaired the owner's interest, free use or enjoyment of property.2
14
Thus, when a property owner bought land near a municipal airport with
the express intention of building several multi-story buildings and the
city (to accommodate airport expansion) thereafter dramatically re-
stricted the height of the buildings that could be placed on the property,
211 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
212 E.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
213 E.g., Redevelopment Auth. of Oil City v. Woodring, 498 Pa. 180, 445 A.2d 724 (1982) (to be
classified as a taking, state action need only substantially deprive an owner of the beneficial use and
enjoyment of his property); Kasparek v.Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1980)
(taking occurs when state action deprives a property owner of the substantial use and enjoyment of
his property); Ventures In Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979) (restric-
tions precluding development on certain parts of subdivided property held to be a taking, even
though property could be used for their reasonable purposes); Pleasant View Util. Dist. v.
Vrandenburg, 545 S.W. 2d 353 (Tenn. 1977) (state actions which destroy, interrupt or interfere with
common and necessary use of real property constitute a taking); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State, 274 Or.
49, 545 P.2d 105 (1976) (taking is any destruction, restriction or interruption of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of property); Cayon v. City of Chicopee, 360 Mass. 606, 277 N.E.2d
116 (1971) (taking is a substantial interference with the use or enjoyment of property); State v.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (conditions so burdensome may be imposed that they are
equivalent to a taking, even though some vestiges of property uses remain in the owner); Roark v.
City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964) (zoning ordinance restricting use of airspace
above land was a taking, even though owner could use the land for other reasonable purposes);
Board of Comm'rs v. Joeckel, 407 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (taking is any substantial interfer-
ence with private property which impairs one's interest, free use or enjoyment in the property);
Scates v. State, 178 Ind. App. 624, 383 N.E.2d 491 (1978) (taking is a substantial interference with
private property which destroys or impairs one's free use of property); City of Austin v. Teague, 556
S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978) (governmental
restrictions on the use of property can become so burdensome as to constitute a taking);J.P. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. State, 51 Ohio App. 2d 83, 367 N.E.2d 54 (1976) (state's substantial interference or
domination of private property is a taking); Schwing v. City of Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct.
App.), application denied, 259 La. 770, 252 So. 2d 667 (1971) (city ordinance requiring that easement
be given to city before subdivision would be approved held a taking); State ex re. Herman v. Hague,
10 Ariz. App. 404, 459 P.2d 321 (1969) (state act in limiting landowner's direct access to highway
was a taking since it substantially impaired use of property); Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v.
Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967) (ordinance
appropriating navigational easement in airspace over land is a taking, even though property below is
only insignificantly affected).
214 Board of Comm'rs v.Joeckel, 407 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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the Idaho Supreme Court found that a taking had occurred.215 Why?
Because even though the ordinance served an important public purpose,
it nevertheless imposed distinct costs upon the affected landowner. The
city had reduced the value of the land by appropriating the owner's air-
space, and the city was required to pay for that property interest.
21 6
An analysis similar to that one just set out would now receive an
unduly chilly reception by the Supreme Court. In Penn Central, the Court
recognized the analytical import of economic diminution, 21 7 but almost
immediately turned aside the assertion that a taking has occurred when
government action "has significantly diminished the value of [prop-
erty]." 218 The Court, citing earlier cases upholding zoning restrictions
and proscriptions of noxious uses, noted that government may destroy
75% to 87.5% of a property's value without effecting a taking.219 The
only conclusion to be drawn from the Court's analysis is that, while eco-
nomic diminution may have some constitutional import, it is relatively
insignificant unless the government appropriates something in excess of
87.5% of a property's value. That line of reasoning was carried to its
logical conclusion in Andrus v. Allard,220 where the Court concluded that
Congress, for all practical purposes, could destroy the entire value of
various Indian artifacts by making it illegal to sell, purchase, barter,
transport, export or import the items. The fact that the aggrieved own-
ers of the once-valuable items "might exhibit the artifacts for an admis-
sions charge" was sufficient to turn aside any constitutional complaint.22'
Thus, under Penn Central and Allard, it seems that economic impact be-
comes relevant to a takings clause analysis only if government action
leaves the property owner almost totally bereft.
Following Penn Central and Allard, lower courts understandably be-
gan to turn away from their previous reliance upon economic impact.
Instead of finding a taking whenever there has been a "substantial" de-
crease in the use or value of an identifiable property interest, courts be-
gan asserting that a taking occurs only if government action deprives the
owner of all value or use. 22 2 If government action merely prohibits some
215 Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964).
216 The court reasoned that the property owner had the right to "reasonable use of the airspace
above his land," and "[e]ven though there is great public benefit to be derived in the maintenance of
an adequate airport and . . .[even though] the purposes of this ordinance are meritorious, public
benefit is not in most cases sufficient reason in and of itself to destroy the use of private property
without payment ofjust compensation." Id. at 564, 567, 394 P.2d at 645, 646.
217 438 U.S. at 124.
218 Id. at 131.
219 Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in
value caused by zoning law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% diminution in
value).
220 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
221 Id. at 66.
222 E.g., Landmark Land Co. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987) (land use regulations must deprive
owner of all value before they constitute a taking); Commonwealth v. Steams Coal & Lumber Co.,
678 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1984) (to be a taking, state action must deprive owner of all beneficial enjoy-
ment); State v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 299 Md. 310, 473 A.2d 892 (1984) (there is a taking only if
state restriction essentially deprives the owner of all beneficial uses of his property); Ramer v. City of
Hoover, 437 So.2d 455 (Ala. 1983) (there is no taking unless the interference is so substantial as to
render the property worthless or useless); Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 422
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property uses, or only substantially diminishes the property's value, no
taking has occurred. 223 Thus, a landowner whose property value is se-
verely diminished when the city denies him access to the municipal sewer
has no constitutional complaint; "there is no taking in the constitutional
sense unless the interference is so substantial as to render the property
worthless or useless."22"
A "total loss of value" test under the takings clause is justifiable only
in limited circumstances. If a property owner mounts a facial attack upon
government regulation, arguing that the mere enactment or adoption of
a regulatory scheme constitutes a taking, a "total loss of value" analysis
may be appropriate. 225 A facial attack, of course, does not present a
"concrete controversy concerning either application of [a regulation] ...
to particular [property uses] . . . or its effect on specific [property inter-
ests]."'2 26 In the absence of a factual record, a court cannot carefully ana-
lyze the economic impact of government action on the property owner.
As a result, a court presented with a facial challenge to regulatory action
might well be justified in applying a "fairly straightforward" test: "A
statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if
it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land .... " -227 Once
beyond the setting of a facial challenge, however, judicial analysis of eco-
nomic impact should be considerably more sensitive than is suggested by
Penn Central and Allard. In the majority of takings clause challenges, a
court will have a factual basis to analyze the actual economic impact of
challenged government action. Accordingly, the economic impact in-
quiry should not turn simply upon whether or not the government has
taken "all economically viable use" of particular property.
The recent emasculation of economic diminution as a viable factor
in takings clause analysis is regrettable. The Court has attempted to but-
tress its results by suggesting that, where an owner "possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle
is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 228
But whatever the surface appeal, the assertion that the Constitution
shields property owners when government grabs the entire "bundle" but
affords little or no protection when the government snatches one
N.Y.S.2d 636 (1979) (in order to be classified as a taking, state action must render property unsuita-
ble for any reasonable income, totally destroying its economic value); see also Metzger v. Town of
Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977) (a taking is a restriction which deprives the owner of
any reasonable use of his land) (decided before Penn Central and Allard); Zygmont v. Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 152 Conn. 550, 210 A.2d 172 (1965) (to constitute a taking, zoning regulations
must do more than devalue property - they must also deprive the owner ofany reasonable property
use) (decided before Penn Central and Allard).
223 Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1034, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1979).
224 Ramer v. City of Hoover, 437 So.2d 455, 460-61 (Ala. 1983) (quoting Kent Island Joint Ven-
ture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 460 (D. Md. 1978)).
225 E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494-97 (1987).
226 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
227 Id. at 296 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); accord Keystone, 480
U.S. at 494-97; cf Pennell v. City of SanJose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 857 (1988) (dismissing claim that a rent
control ordinance constituted a taking as "premature" because the challenged elements of the ordi-
nance had never been applied) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. at 296 n.37).
228 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
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"strand" at a time does not withstand scrutiny. Its logic rests on the
assumption that the fifth amendment protects the whole, but not the
component parts, of that amalgam of rights known as "property." It
should be clear, however, that the term "property," as used in the tak-
ings clause, embraces the component elements of the "bundle. ' 229 The
term is not used in the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by
law." 230 Rather, the fifth amendment protects the entire "group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to pos-
sess, use and dispose of it."231 The constitutional rationalization that the
government cannot take the whole "bundle" but can take any number of
"strands" just short of that is a modern heresy. "The constitutional pro-
vision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess." 2
32
The Court's "strand-at-a-time" exception to the takings clause de-
rives from its failure carefully to scrutinize the first Penn Central factor,
which requires an analysis of the character of the government action.
The Court has failed to assess the importance of the police power justifi-
cation for given regulatory actions by suggesting that such an inquiry is
unnecessary or satisfied upon the flimsiest of showings. 233 Under the
Court's approach, moreover, an "average reciprocity of benefit" exists
almost as a matter of definition. Any regulation affecting the use of prop-
erty, after all, is enacted "because the public wanted it very much."
23 4
Since the aggrieved property owner is also part of the public, there must
be some benefit - which apparently equals an average reciprocity of
advantage. 2
3 5
Once the police power justification for government regulation is ig-
nored and the average reciprocity of advantage inquiry anesthetized, the
Court's prior cases virtually compel the conclusion that unless govern-
ment regulation takes virtually everything, any action short of that passes
muster. The Mugler line of cases and the early zoning decisions, relied
upon by the Court in Penn Central to support its "strand-at-a-time" ap-
proach, are instances where government regulations dramatically re-
duced the value of property owners' "bundles" without resulting in a
taking.23 6 As demonstrated above, however, these cases turned on the
229 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
230 Id. at 377.
231 Id. at 377-78.
232 Id. at 378.
233 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,133-34 n. 30 (1978); see supra notes
103-05.
234 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
235 Indeed, in Penn Central, the court explicitly adopted the above analysis:
Unless we are to reject the judgement of the New York City Council that the preservation of
landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both economically and by im-
proving the quality of life in the city as a whole - which we are unwilling to do - we cannot
conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the
Landmarks Law.
438 U.S. at 134-35.
Cf id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disputing that the New York landmark law resulted in
any cognizable reciprocity of advantage).
236 Id. at 131 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
[Vol. 64:1
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
character of the government action - not on the fact that the govern-
ment wisely refrained from total confiscation.
23 7
The proper role of economic diminution in a takings clause analysis
is reflected in Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal. There, after
rejecting the contention that the coal mining subsidence act under con-
sideration abated a public nuisance 238 or secured an average reciprocity
of advantage, 23 9 the Court concluded that because the act forbade the
mining of "certain coal," it was constitutionally infirm.240 The regulatory
burden placed upon a single of the coal miners' discrete property rights
- the right "to mine certain coal" - was sufficient to constitute a taking
because it "has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it."241 The fact that the government had
taken only a single "strand" from the mine operators was not determina-
tive. On the contrary, the State of Pennsylvania had gone "too far" in
requiring coal mine operators to leave identifiable coal in place, even
though the right to mine other coal was unaffected. 242 The operators
had valuable, marketable interests in the minerals that were affected by
the subsidence act and, in the absence of a strong police power justifica-
tion for the act or a true average reciprocity of advantage, Pennsylvania
could not pluck identifiable, marketable "strands" from their "bundles"
without compensation.
The modern Court has not completely abandoned Justice Holmes'
economic diminution analysis. 243 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. ,244 the
Court concluded that public disclosure of certain proprietary data that
had been revealed to the Environmental Protection Agency under an as-
surance of confidentiality would constitute a taking. 245 Had the Court
237 See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
238 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
239 Id. at 415.
240 Id. at 414.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 415 ("We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change.").
243 The Court, of course, has recently upheld a second Pennsylvania subsidence act virtually in-
distinguishable from that struck down in Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, B.Y.U.J. Pub. L. 261, 298
(1987) ("any differences" between the statute struck down in Pennsylvania Coal and the one upheld in
Keystone "are trivial"). It is at least arguable, however, that Keystone does not depart from the analysis
described above. The statute at issue in Pennsylvania Coal was described by Justice Holmes as "a
'private benefit' statute since it 'ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the
owner of the coal.'" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414). By
contrast, the Court found that Pennsylvania was "exercising its police power to abate activity akin to
a public nuisance" in passing the new statute. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488. "T]he public interest in
preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one, which in many instances has not
required compensation." Id. at 492. Thus, while Keystone reaches a different result than Pennsylvania
Coal, it nevertheless reaffirms the analysis of the earlier case. The nature of the state's interest in
Keystone - the abatement of a public nuisance - was simply so substantial that any asserted "dimi-
nution of value" was insufficient "to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal." Id.; see id. at 488
("the nature of the state's interest in the regulation" is "critical in takings analysis"). But see supra
notes 2-3.
244 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
245 Monsanto had argued that any government disclosure of scientific data the company had re-
vealed to the EPA in order to obtain registration of its chemical products would constitute a taking.
Id. at 1005-08. The Court rejected that broad assertion because Monsanto revealed the information
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followed the analysis in Penn Central or Allard, which suggests that eco-
nomic diminution must be nearly complete before it raises constitutional
concern, the government disclosure at issue in Monsanto would not have
constituted a taking. The challenged disclosure, after all, did not destroy
the entire value of the proprietary data: "The data retain usefulness for
Monsanto even after they are disclosed - for example, as bases from
which to develop new products or refine old products, as marketing and
advertising tools, or as information necessary to obtain registration in
foreign countries." 246 The fact that disclosure would not destroy the en-
tire value of the data, however, was "irrelevant to the determination of
the economic impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's property
right. ' 247 The economic value of the proprietary data was the "competi-
tive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive
access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of the data would
destroy that competitive edge. '248 Thus, the diminution in value of a
single property "strand" - identified by the Court as "competitive ad-
vantage" - was sufficient to raise constitutional concern even though
the value of Monsanto's entire "bundle" was not destroyed.
Application of an economic diminution analysis similar to that used
in Pennsylvania Coal or Monsanto to my hypothetical property owners sug-
gests that a taking may have occurred in each case. As already noted, the
nature of the government action in each instance is such that some analy-
sis of economic impact is required. 24 9 The government, of course, has
not taken the entire "bundle" of either property owner. Therefore, if
one were to take Penn Central's suggestion that any diminution in value
short of 100% is insufficient to constitute a taking,25 0 neither property
owner would have a constitutional complaint. It is virtually certain, how-
ever, that the owner of the vegetable garden will have a valid fifth amend-
ment claim because the government has physically seized a corner of her
backyard. Thus, the "total loss of value" test for economic diminution
cannot be applied to deny the home gardener relief.
But, while most courts would never think of refusing the home gar-
denerjust compensation simply because the government did not take her
entire backyard, many would indulge in identical reasoning in the case of
the commercial developer. 25 ' Such a rigid analysis of economic diminu-
to the government to obtain permission to market its chemical products and the company knew, at
the time it made the revelations, that the information might be disclosed. Id. Accordingly, govern-
ment disclosure of the bulk of Monsanto's proprietary data would not impinge upon the company's
investment-backed expectations and would not, therefore, constitute a taking. Id. at 1007. Certain
information revealed by Monsanto between the years 1972 and 1978, however, had been disclosed
under an explicit assurance of confidentiality. Id. at 1010-1 1. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
disclosure of that information would transgress the company's investment-backed expectations and
would constitute a taking. Id. at 1011-13.
246 Id. at 1012.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Supra notes 208-11.
250 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
251 Landmark Land Co. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed
sub noam. Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987) (no taking because mountain
view ordinance did not deprive commercial property owner of all value).
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tion is erroneous. Although the government did not appropriate the en-
tire value of the developer's property when it enacted the mountain view
ordinance, it nevertheless plucked a valuable and marketable "strand"
from the developer's "bundle." The ordinance, in effect, burdened the
developer's property with a scenic easement, with all benefits flowing to
the public. Moreover, that easement - like the corner of the gardener's
backyard - can be legally described, parcelled out, bought and sold.
2 52
Accordingly, even though the commercial property owner has not lost
everything, she - like the mine operators in Pennsylvania Coal and the
chemical company in Monsanto - has lost to the public an identifiable,
marketable property interest. This diminution in the value of her "bun-
dle" deserves constitutional protection. Whether or not this diminution
in value must be compensated under the takings clause, however, re-
quires consideration of the final Penn Central factor.
C. Investment-Backed Expectations: Is An Award Of Compensation 'Just"?
The third factor under the Court's analysis in Penn Central is whether
government action interferes with a "distinct investment-backed expecta-
tion." 253 This factor is related to, but is nevertheless analytically separa-
ble from, economic diminution. There cannot 'be any significant
interference with investment-backed expectations unless there has been
some economic diminution. But, while an inquiry into economic diminu-
tion relates primarily to the question whether there has been injury to a
cognizable property interest, an analysis of investment-backed expecta-
tions goes to the fundamental issue of compensability; if a given instance
of economic diminution does not interfere with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the property owner, no compensation is due. The factor is akin
to the "antitrust injury" requirement of the Sherman Act; the takings
clause does not protect a citizen against any diminution in property val-
ues-only against a diminution that interferes with the reasonable expec-
tations of the citizen as a property owner.25 4 If particular government
actions do not interfere with the legitimate expectations of an owner in
relation to her property, an award of compensation, rather than just,
would be a windfall.
Although the concept has been frequently invoked, 255 the decided
cases give little practical guidance as to what constitutes interference
with an "investment-backed expectation." Indeed, the Court's elabora-
tion of this prong of the takings analysis is rather confused - and con-
252 Scenic easements have demonstrable value and can be purchased. See Cantrell, Scenic Ease-
ments: Evaluation Considerations, 49 REAL EST. APPRAISER & ANALYST 61 (1983); SuTEE, Scenic Ease-
ments, 34 APPRAISALJ. 531 (1966).
253 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
254 Cf Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, cert. denied sub nom. Treadway
Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. 1090 (1978) (Clayton Act does not protect against any loss causally
linked to an antitrust violation; rather, successful plaintiffs must show that their particular injuries
are of the type that the statute was intended to forestall).
255 E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,493-97 (1987); Connolly
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
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fusing. For example, although the "investment-backed expectation"
inquiry almost certainly flows from Justice Holmes' conclusion in Penn-
sylvania Coal that the state could not interfere with the mine operators'
expectation that they could harvest "certain coal," 2 56 the Penn Central
Court flatly stated that property owners do not establish a taking "by
showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property in-
terest that they heretofore had believed was available for develop-
ment." 257  The Penn Central dictum, of course, contradicts the
Pennsylvania Coal analysis. Contrary to the Court's later assertion, Justice
Holmes obviously concluded that government interdiction of "a prop-
erty interest that [the mine operators] heretofore had believed was avail-
able for development" 258 was an essential element of their takings claim.
This tension between Penn Central and Pennsylvania Coal suggests that the
Court itself is not quite sure what it should look for under the "expecta-
tion" prong.
In addition to the confusion just noted, investment-backed expecta-
tions, as construed by the Court, are subject to a significant amount of
government manipulation. "Property" exists only to the extent that an
"owner" has enforceable rights. (A suburbanite's "ownership" of her
home, after all, is valid only to the extent that government will enforce
the provisions of her deed.)259 Accordingly, the foundation for many
(perhaps most) investment-backed expectations is the property owner's
reliance upon various government regulatory schemes. Yet, despite the
necessary relationship between legitimate expectations and government
regulation, the Court has suggested that property owners cannot justifia-
bly rely upon any given regulatory structure. Recent cases, in fact, sug-
gest that government actions which upset expectations founded upon
regulatory regimes do not ordinarily give rise to a taking.2 60 A property
256 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922); see Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1233
n. 116 (1967) (ascribing the "investment-backed expectation" test to Pennsylvania Coal).
257 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
258 Id.
259 See generally Weidenbach, The Aeaning of First English In The Context of Takings Clause Jurispru-
dence, 28 MUN. Arr'y 6, 7 (1987).
260 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986) (a severe with-
drawal penalty enacted under a 1980 amendment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
[ERISA] does not interfere with employers' investment-backed expectations because "[p]ension
plans . . .were the objects of legislative concern long before the passage of ERISA ... [the 1980
amendments gave] sufficient notice not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also
that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations"); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1022 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
Court's conclusion that, despite a provision of the Trade Secrets Act which forbids government
disclosure of trade secrets, "an 'industry that long has been the focus of great public concern and
significant government regulation' can have no reasonable expectation that the Government will not
later find public disclosure of trade secrets to be in the public interest") (quoting id. at 1008); see also
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 638 F. Supp. 350, 357 (Regional Rail
Reorg. Ct. 1986) (railroad has no reasonable investment-backed expectations where "no industry
has a longer history of pervasive federal regulation than the railroad industry" and where "no sector
of the railroad industry has been more heavily regulated than the passenger service sector"); Gate-
way Apartments, Inc. v. Mayor of Nutley, 605 F. Supp. 1161 (D.NJ. 1985) (requirement that land-
lord return 75% of tax rebates to his tenants does not infringe any investment-backed expectation
because the ordinance was ensconced in the heavily regulated landlord-tenant area); cf Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (requirement that shopping center make its
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owner, it seems, has little room for complaint when the government
changes its mind regarding which property interests it will foster and
protect.
Because of the Penn Central dictum and the Court's reluctance to rec-
ognize expectations founded upon regulatory regularity, the Court has
rarely found that government action interferes with a distinct investment-
backed expectation. The property owner who proves that the govern-
ment has taken a discrete, valuable property right she previously pos-
sessed will be dismissed with the Penn Central observation that such losses
do not constitute takings: no reasonable expectation has been infringed
because the asserted injury is merely a "unilateral expectation or an ab-
stract need. '261 The property owner who attempts to buttress her claim
by showing that a prior regulatory scheme rendered her expectation
more than "unilateral" or "abstract" is met with the submission that past
official actions do not preclude the government from changing its
mind.262 As with economic diminution inquiry addressed above, the net
effect has been that the Court finds no interference with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations unless government action physically appropri-
ates or essentially destroys the entire value of the property owner's
holdings.263
premises available for informational picketing does not constitute a taking; "the state-authorized
limitation" of the shopping center's " 'right to exclude others' " is not "essential to the use or eco-
nomic value of [its] property").
261 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
262 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984).
263 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 499 & n.27 (1987) (Court
concludes that a statute which requires mine operators to leave valuable minerals in place does not
infringe the operators' investment-backed expectations because the statute does not deny them "the
economically viable use of [their] property." In a footnote, the Court clarifies that, under its analy-
sis, a physical intrusion or a regulatory action resulting in total loss of value would violate a reason-
able investment-backed expectation: "We do not suggest that the State may physically appropriate
relatively small amounts of private property for its own use without paying just compensation. The
question here is whether there has been any taking at all when no coal has been physically appropri-
ated, and the regulatory program places a burden on the use of only a small fraction of the property
that is subjected to regulation"); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006, 1008-09 (1984)
(despite provision of the Trade Secrets Act which prohibits government dissemination of trade
secrets, government disclosure of proprietary data submitted by a chemical company does not trans-
gress the investment-backed expectations of the company because the government, "upon focusing
on the issue, [found] disclosure to be in the public interest"); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 425 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (change in a regulatory structure imposing significant costs upon
participants in regulated retirement funds does not violate any investment-backed expectations of
fund participants; "[p]rudent employers ... had more than sufficient notice not only that pension
plans were ... regulated, but also that withdrawal might trigger additional financial obligations ....
'Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end' ") (citations omitted); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 67-68, 65 (1979) (a prohibition "of the sale of lawfully acquired [Indian artifacts]" does not
effect a taking because "[t]he regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the arti-
facts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has
been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property
right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate
must be viewed in its entirety"); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) (pen-
dency of condemnation proceedings does not effect a taking requiring compensation; "[a]t least in
the absence of an interference with an owner's legal right to dispose of his land, even a substantial
reduction of the attractiveness of the property to potential purchasers does not entitle the owner to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment").
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The Court's draconian construction of what constitutes interference
with an investment-backed expectation is unwarranted. Property owners
surely have the right to expect that the takings clause guards against
more than total confiscation. The Court's apparent refusal to recognize
that fact, moreover, like its hesitancy to accord constitutional importance
to anything but the most severe diminution in economic value, is linked
to its failure carefully to consider the precise analytical content of each
Penn Central prong. In Penn Central itself, for example, the Court cited
two early zoning cases and one relatively recent nuisance case to support
its assertion that an investment-backed expectation is not infringed sim-
ply because government action deprives an owner of previously available
property rights. 264 Those cases, however, simply do not stand for the
proposition that government may, without consequence, ignore a prop-
erty owner's actual expectations. Rather, those cases establish that gov-
ernment regulations which indeed interfere with the expectations of
property owners may nevertheless withstand scrutiny under the takings
clause if they are supported by a strong police power justification 265 or
secure a true average reciprocity of advantage. 266 Despite the Penn Cen-
tral dictum, analysis of investment-backed expectations should hinge upon
whether government action deprives the owner of "the ability to exploit
a property interest that [she] heretofore had believed was available for
development,- 267 not on whether the character of the government action
justifies the intrusion upon those expectations. The character of govern-
ment action is important to the takings analysis, but so is whether that
action impinges upon the property owner's investment-backed expecta-
tions. The Court should not dismiss a contention that a given govern-
ment action infringes a property owner's subjective expectations by
citing cases that turn upon an antecedent prong of the Penn Central
analysis.
A property owner's expectations, of course, must be "reason-
able."' 268  As Justice Holmes recognized in Pennsylvania Coal,
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." 26 9 Accordingly, a property owner has no right either
to expect that regulatory schemes will remain unaltered or to demand
264 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (citing Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
265 E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (proscription of excavations be-
low the water table as a public nuisance); supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
266 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 106 (1909) (height limitation established in general zoning law
does not constitute a taking; "legislative enactments for the safety, comfort or convenience of the
people and for the benefit of properly owners generally are valid") (emphasis added); Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (property setback requirements contained in zoning ordinance does not consti-
tute a taking; "we recently have held.., that comprehensive zoning laws and ordinances... are, in their
general scope, valid under the federal Constitution") (emphasis added); supra notes 202-204 and
accompanying text.
267 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
268 E.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) ("The final inquiry
suggested for determining whether the Act constitutes a 'taking' under the Fifth Amendment is
whether [it] has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations.").
269 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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compensation for each change that adversely affects her interests. The
Court, however, should temper its recent tendency to conclude that
property owners may not reasonably rely upon the interests created by a
regulatory regime. 270 A property owner's reliance upon some regulatory
schemes - including, for instance, generally applicable zoning ordi-
nances - can give rise to legitimate expectations that should be pro-
tected under the takings clause.27 1 Although the Court has noted that
"[p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Constitution" but rather
"are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state law," 27
2
recognition of this fact does not lead inexorably to the positivistic conclu-
sion that what the government gives it can also take away.273 Rather, the
fact that property rights are founded upon government regulation un-
derscores the reality that changes in the rules which define property may
in fact take property.
To successfully claim interference with an investment-backed expec-
tation, a property owner must be able to point to specific facts and cir-
cumstances which make her expectation reasonable. This requires an
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the property owner's use and
enjoyment of the property - including the impact of any regulatory
changes on that use or enjoyment. In short, "[a] reasonable investment-
backed expectation must be just that. The owner must have some invest-
ment at stake made in contemplation of a purpose or use based upon a
reasonable expectation." 274 Government actions which interfere with
such a contemplated purpose or use transgress a reasonable, investment-
backed expectation. And, despite the rather categorical approach of Penn
Central and other cases, 275 the Court has undertaken such a fact-sensitive
inquiry on at least one occasion.
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,276 Kaiser Aetna, the lessee of a shal-
low, non-navigable pond on the island of Oahu, Hawaii devised a plan to
dredge the pond and connect it by means of an eight-foot deep channel
to the Pacific Ocean. The pond, as altered, would become a marina to
270 E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984).
271 Compare Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 564-67, 394 P.2d 641, 645-46 (1964) (prop-
erty owner who bought land zoned for high-rise development with the express intention of building
multistory buildings is entitled to compensation when the city thereafter passes an ordinance dra-
matically reducing the height of construction permitted on the property to facilitate expansion of a
municipal airport) with Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, 632 F. Supp. 815, 823 (N.D. Ga.
1985), aft'd, 791 F.2d 170 (11 th Cir. 1986) (property owner who bought property hoping that county
would rezone it to permit highly profitable development is not subjected to a taking when the rezon-
ing request is denied; "the purchase of the subject property and the subsequent application for
rezoning do not evidence a reasonable investment-backed expectation but, rather, a business
gamble").
272 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
273 See supra notes 143-49.
274 Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 620 F. Supp. 609, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and vacated as not ripe,
818 F.2d 1449, 1453-54 (property owners had neither submitted a development plan nor applied for
a variance, and the city had made no final decision regarding acceptable uses for the property),
opinion amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 775 (1988).
275 E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1022 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
276 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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serve as the centerpiece of an exclusive subdivision development. The
Army Corps of Engineers advised Kaiser Aetna that no government per-
mits were needed for the dredging operation inside the pond and the
Corps acquiesced in the proposal to connect the pond with the ocean.
Once the new marina was operational, however, the Corps asserted that,
as navigable waters of the United States, the marina was subject to a fed-
eral navigational servitude which precluded Kaiser Aetna from denying
public access to the pond. Kaiser Aetna understandably balked at the
government's imposition and the government eventually sued Kaiser
Aetna to enforce the servitude. 277 The district court denied the govern-
ment's request for an injunction to require public access, reasoning "that
the Government lacked the authority to open the now dredged pond to
the public without payment of compensation." 278 The court of appeals
reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
Kaiser Aetna's dredging of the pond had "convert[ed] into a public
aquatic park that which [Kaiser Aetna] had invested millions of dollars in
improving on the assumption that it was a privately owned pond." 2 79
The Court concluded that the government's attempt to impose a
right of public access to the marina "goes so far beyond ordinary regula-
tion or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking." 280
Although the Court stated that "[m]ore than one factor contributes to
this result," 281 the analysis of the opinion focuses most closely on the
impact of the navigational servitude on Kaiser Aetna's investment-backed
expectations. 282 The pond, the Court noted, was incapable of navigation
prior to Kaiser Aetna's efforts and had "always been considered to be
private property under Hawaiian law." 283 And, while the government
could have refused consent to dredge the pond, or placed various condi-
tions on its consent, it did not do so. Accordingly, "what petitioners now
have is a body of water that was private property under Hawaiian law,
linked to navigable water by a channel dredged by them with the consent
of the Government." 284 The Court reasoned that, "[w]hile the consent
of individual officials representing the United States cannot 'estop' the
United States, . . it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies
embodied in the concept of 'property' - expectancies that, if sufficiently
important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes
277 Id. at 166-68.
278 Id. at 169.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 178.
281 Id.
282 To be sure, the Court's analysis did not rest entirely upon the government's interference with
investment-backed expectations. The Court, in fact, addressed all three Penn Central factors. The
opinion noted that the character of the government action raised substantial concern because it
"result[ed] in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina," thereby depriving Kaiser
Aetna of "the 'right to exclude.'" Id. at 179-80. The servitude, moreover, would cause a substantial
"devaluation of petitioners' private property." Id. at 180. These factors, in combination with the
government's interference with Kaiser Aetna's investment-backed expectations, resulted in the
Court's conclusion that the government "may not, without invoking its eminent domain power and
paying just compensation, require [Kaiser Aetna] to allow free access to the dredged pond." Id. at
180.




over the management of the landowner's property.' ' 285 The govern-
ment's imposition of the navigational servitude interfered with just such
an expectancy because the record demonstrated that Kaiser Aetna legiti-
mately believed that it could treat the improved pond as private
property. 28
6
The Court's investment-backed expectation analysis in Kaiser Aetna is
considerably more rigorous than that suggested by Penn Central 287 or, for
that matter, Ruckelshaus. The government, after all, had done nothing
more than attempt to strip a real estate developer of an interest that it
"heretofore had believed was available" for its use and enjoyment. 288 1
There was, moreover, a substantial argument that the developer in Kaiser
Aetna could not legitimately rely upon the Corps' acquiescence in the
dredging plans because, once the pond became navigable, the developer
should have foreseen that the Corps, "upon focusing on the issue, would
find [access] to be in the public interest." 289 These arguments, however,
were not dispositive. Instead, the Court focused upon the subjective ex-
pectations of the developer regarding the use and development of the
pond. Because the record demonstrated that the developer created a
navigable marina with the express intention of operating it as private
property, government interposition of a public navigational servitude in-
fringed a distinct investment-backed expectation.
Application of the above analysis to my hypothetical backyard gar-
dener and real estate developer demonstrates that the government ac-
tion in each case has interfered with a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation. That conclusion as regards the homeowner, of course, is
relatively straightforward: she bought and developed her backyard for
the purpose, among others, of maintaining a garden and the construction
of the road frustrates that expectation. Similar reasoning shows that the
mountain view ordinance has likewise intruded upon the investment-
backed expectations of the developer.
The commercial developer obtained her property with a specific
purpose in mind - the construction of a high-rise office tower. The
mountain view ordinance, of course, totally frustrates that expectation.
Although the city could argue that any expectation regarding future con-
struction of an office tower is "unilateral" or "abstract" 290 because the
mountain view ordinance merely stripped the property owner of an inter-
est that she "heretofore had believed was available for development,"
291
the surrounding facts suggest that the developer had a legitimate basis
285 Id. (citations omitted).
286 Id.
287 See generally Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981).
288 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
289 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1008-09. The Kaiser Aetna Court, in fact, expressly
noted that "the strict logic of the more recent cases limiting the Government's liability to pay dam-
ages for riparian access, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, might completely swallow up any pri-
vate claim for 'just compensation' " under the facts of the case. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
290 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (referencing Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972)).
291 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
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for expecting that she could exploit that interest. The government, after
all, had indicated that the proposed use of the property was permissible
because the contemplated development was in accord with existing zon-
ing regulations. This fact should be given at least as much weight as the
government "acquiescence" noted in Kaiser Aetna. 292 The developer's
reliance upon the zoning regulations, moreover, was not unreasonable.
Indeed, the citizens who opposed the developer were unsuccessful in
changing the zoning regulations to block the proposed construction.
Thus, this is not a case where a property owner was "gambling" that a
regulatory scheme would be altered in her favor 293 or where she should
have recognized that the government, "upon focusing on the issue,"
would refuse to recognize her interests. 294 On the contrary, the sur-
rounding facts demonstrate that the developer made an investment "in
contemplation of a purpose or use based upon a reasonable expecta-
tion." 295 The mountain view ordinance infringed that reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation.
Conclusion
The takings clause has not had a happy history. The Court's con-
struction of the clause has been tortuous, inconsistent and "essentially ad
hoc." 296 Complaining property owners with closely analogous interests
have obtained exceedingly different results, as demonstrated by the dis-
parate treatment that would almost certainly be accorded the hypotheti-
cal homeowner and developer. The homeowner's invocation of the
takings clause would quite predictably result in a monetary award. By
contrast, the developer who lost sixty-five percent of her commercial
property value would receive nothing. For her, the compensation prom-
ised by the fifth amendment is a fairy tale; a chimera floating on the con-
stitutional horizon that is, somehow, always barely beyond grasp.
The Supreme Court is undoubtedly aware of the unsatisfactory re-
sults dictated by its takings clause jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court has
recently tried to buttress its analysis by closely scrutinizing the rationality
of regulations which adversely affect property interests. 297 The Court,
however, should be wary before subjecting all regulations affecting the
use or enjoyment of property to strict "means/ends" scrutiny. In most
other areas of the law, absent substantive constitutional infirmity, gov-
ernment regulation is tested against a standard of bare rationality. There
is little reason to suppose that property regulations should be accorded
different treatment. If, as is undoubtedly the case, takings clause values
deserve more rigorous protection than is secured by existing precedent,
292 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
293 Cf Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, 632 F. Supp. 815, 823 (N.D. Ga. 1985) aft'd,
791 F.2d 170 (11 th Cir. 1986) (developer purchases property hoping that it will be rezoned to per-
mit highly profitable construction).
294 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008 (1984).
295 Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 620 F. Supp. 609, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and vacated as not ripe,
818 F.2d 1449, 1453-54, opinion amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 775
(1988).
296 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
297 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987).
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the Court should provide that protection by shoring up the substantive
requirements of the clause itself.
Delineating the precise requirements of the takings clause has
proven to be a daunting task. The Court, in fact, has despaired of its
ability to distill "objective rules" to govern the area.2 98 Nevertheless, the
Court has derived a three-factor test, first announced in Penn Central, to
aid the fifth amendment analysis. But, while repeatedly invoking the
character of the government action, economic diminution, and interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations, the Court has failed to give
these factors precise content or substantive bite. For example, in analyz-
ing the character of government action, the Court has focused almost
exclusively upon physical dispossession. Then, in considering economic
diminution and interference with investment-backed expectations, it has
approved any outcome short of complete confiscation. As a result, only
those government actions which physically dispossess the property
owner or totally destroy the value of her holdings have resulted in an
award of compensation. I believe this result is improper and have sug-
gested a recasting of the Penn Central factors which gives government
considerably less latitude.
The central inquiry under the first Penn Central factor - the charac-
ter of the government action - should be whether the government ac-
tion imposes burdens that are appropriately carried by the community as
a whole rather than individual property owners. This requires an analy-
sis of why the government is acting, and how the action affects the indi-
vidual property owners. The Court's traditional approach, which focuses
upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion, does not adequately
answer these questions. The Court's inquiry here should instead hinge
upon whether the government action furthers an important police power
objective and whether the action results in an average reciprocity of ad-
vantage between the affected property owner and the public. If the gov-
ernment action serves a truly compelling public need, 299 or
unquestionably secures an average reciprocity of advantage,3 00 this
prong of the analysis may be determinative of the takings issue. In most
cases, however, further inquiry into the Penn Central factors will be re-
quired.
The Court's analysis of economic diminution, the second Penn Cen-
tral factor, has been decidedly permissive. Almost any economic impact
short of complete confiscation passes scrutiny. The takings clause, how-
ever, protects against more than absolute appropriation. Therefore, the
focus of the economic diminution inquiry should not be whether the
property owner has lost her entire "bundle" or suffered a total loss of
value. Rather, the Court should inquire whether the property owner has
been deprived of a valuable, identifiable property interest. Loss of a sin-
gle "strand" is a real injury that raises consitutional concern.
298 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2399
n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
300 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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An analysis of investment-backed expectations is necessary to deter-
mine whether particular economic injuries should result in an award of
compensation. If particular government actions do not interfere with the
legitimate expectations of the property owner, no monetary award is due.
The takings clause, after all, only requires "just" compensation. The
Court has given little guidance here. Indeed, the Court's explorations of
this factor have rarely focused on the actual expectations of affected
property owners, and dictum in Penn Central itself seemingly rejects ex-
plicit consideration of such evidence. The classic decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,30° however, turned upon the Court's analysis of the
property owner's actual expectation. And, as evidenced by its own deci-
sion in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,30 2 the Court has not completely aban-
doned that original understanding.
The preceding analysis provides protection to the hypothetical real
estate developer as well as the homeowner. The mountain view ordi-
nance, while a legitimate exercise of the police power, does not serve a
compelling public need or secure anything even closely approximating
an average reciprocity of advantage between the developer and the pub-
lic. Because the character of the government action does not, by itself,
sustain the imposition upon the property owner, a careful inquiry into
whether the developer has sustained a substantial economic loss is re-
quired. The result of the inquiry is apparent: the developer has been
forced to cede a scenic easement having definite and ascertainable value
to the public. Even though she has not lost everything, she has lost a
significant "strand" from her "bundle" of rights. That loss, moreover, is
compensable because enactment of the mountain view ordinance de-
prived the developer of a distinct investment-backed expectation: her
otherwise well-founded right to construct a multi-story office tower.
The analysis outlined above infuses the Penn Central analysis with sig-
nificant new vigor. Under my approach, both the vegetable gardener and
the commercial developer can legitimately lay claim to the protection of
the takings clause. This is justifiable, I believe, because both property
owners have been deprived of closely analogous property rights. They
deserve analogous treatment. My approach, of course, fetters somewhat
the ability of government to accomplish, without cost, all public objec-
tives that it might deem desirable. That fact does not give me significant
pause; that is, after all, the primary mission of the takings clause. That
mission, moreover, is not well served by a shifting or weak-kneed consti-
tutional analysis. The Court's elaboration of the takings clause has been
too long without a consistent, workable plot. The Penn Central factors, if
carefully and thoughtfully applied, can provide that missing element.
Property owners invoking the takings clause deserve a happy ending.
301 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
302 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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